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lBt l'04nctlO11: b. t1"Oblep& ~!1 Jib!. I!thO(! 
The purpose ot thi. briet note 18 to call atten-
t10n to reoen' advances toward iU1 adequate d.et1n1tIc 
of 11t., and to the p08s1bl11t7 tbat th. problem of 
detW t1_ baa ... 'ua11,. been 801 ftct. 
!be .. w pro,"ss h1qea large17 OIl the blocbttmi-
cal 001\08Pt ot. _ .. tal". the ooncept haa bee .... 
•• pe.l*n,. 11Ipe ! aut' the lut decade 0.1' .0, 
putlcularl,. in oonnection nth the vlJ1U1 and the en-
.,.. All the w.x hq)11 •• , autooate.1.,.18 is the Pl'O-
0 ••• in which a lIubatance e.O" to cata.1yae, f'1'0JIl 1ta 
.nvl~t, ad41tlenal quaattt! •• ot the Bubstan •• 
lhelt. Au'tooatal,t10 aot1_ 1. an obv1OU1 Pl"Opel"'ty 
ot the vl:ua. an4 _ c1.. .,,""Ation it appeua bl-
deed to be the 801. aha to anllutlon 1thloh that 0 .... 
ganJ.aa 18 able to advance. 
fh18 geael'lllle0UJf8e of thought _,. pel'hapa be ate-
grated 1». toMGl. det1nlt1()1J8. It .... reasonable new 
to that t 'i t 01>-:1 :e-
It -1, pe:rbapa , ... N ...... bl. to auppoae that such • 
• ta .... " would NndeJl useless a thaaU expressl,.. intended to 
work towa»d8 a det1nltl. ot lire, tM author ot the above text 
would have us belle .... that; the task 14 cO.l'IQ)letM .. 81", at least, 
Mal'l,. 80. It la. however. p ..... 1a.ly this ldn4 ot attitude and 
th1s ldnd ot etatement against whioh this theal. 18 direeted. 
. . . fa 
lQl 
2 
THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION. ~ tem detin1tion itself must 
• 
'be defined. The mean1nss ot det1n1tlon are aa diverse as the 
selenees which attellPt to detine. Eve17 science bas 1ta "det1n1. 
tiona 1ft 11' 1t 18 It. .ol~. ot the "&1, 1t. de.f1nltlcna must be 
obtained ind:uo'tlvelf.2 1'hereto:re, the,. depend directly upon the 
method of tm. partIcular seieneth !h18 mea:ne that to the ext$llt 
that the method 01 a paJltloular selenee 18 oJ'da1Md to exam1ne 
the nature ot th1nga, to the same extent are the "datinlt! .. " 
obta1ned"real det1nlt1an... Ac •• rd1ngJ.y. we are able to diatin-
gu1ah three _in ,typee otso~l.d det11l1t1ona claimed by the 
various modem seienoM, the solentist$ tbe:rn$elvea. however, 
usUAll,. would not use these tenna, the .... ntial det1nl tlon 
(Whlch leads to knowle4ge of the ane.losous natUl'e of metaPh7&lcal 
iJ $ 
21 am U$1ng the 'beN "1nd1JCtlontt after the manner ot George 
P. Ilubertaru:, S.J. f in fhe Phl1OSlih{; of Human Naturel 'SIP. 888-389: "It hu already be_' BUgge. . hi! a a ...... lral va knowl-
edge baa two stages t 1'1%"8t, the stage of dlaoovo17 or onqu1l"1J 
s .. OI'l4, that fit critical evaluation or judgment upon the conelu-
sl •• 8acbed, or in otbeJ' worda ... sta.S- or inductlon and a 
second .tage of ~J1ation andew.luation (ria. Invetlon18. via 
ludic11). - r_ 
"!he _thod or dllcOV4itry OJ." 1ndu.ctlon concema the oris1n ot 
the ov1d ... with which one is to de .. l. At this p.1nt,. there aw 
two ba.81cal17 dltteJlfmt methods. FOP some evIdence is immediatel 
presented, in e:a:;perlenee.... We can call this the methodot 'in-
tell1gIble tnductlon.' 
"on the other hand. mIi1n7 things cannot bedlacovered by im-
mediate 1.tu11ght.... to awlve at an understanding, we have to us 
l'Ioundabout methode at lnve.tiga:tlotl.... fhls rotlJ'ldabout and ve'l'Y 
ccap11cated. pX'OC ••• of' dlsC0T8:ry we call 'rational induction. ,. 
Philosophy pl'ooeoda from 1nte1l1g1ble lnduction, p~slcal science 
tHm ratlcmal irlductlon. 
3 
def1nltlOll8), the open.tlcmal definition, and the construct. 
1'he "assent!.al 4e:r1n1t:f.on.tt as QIl8 m1l#1t auppo,u), 1s eon-
eamed nth the 8ssence of the thing a..t1ned. Ita proper use 1. 
the log10al olaaslf'loatlc:m. of tbinp aocol'ding to pnus andspe-
el... ?'hue.!!!l 18 e.aent1aUr d..tined as Mtlona;l !J!a.,. The 
18 no.thlns 1n ,.alit.,. that correapOllda to this d..tini tion !!. such. 
There exiata onl.7 !!!!!. "tional an1mal or tha,t "ttonal animal. 
A _taph)'aloal anal,..1_, then, «0.8 no" o.elud. to a logioal 
4e.t1nit1on .. eaepuaccl4ent&ll,.. 1». tM ••• _ that; 1t 18 one and 
to.. .ame ph11eaopber whouees 10g10al d..tWOl.... to el .... 117 
those ebjee.a _ 1s oo.u14er:Uls in ~1' that he _,. ~ able to 
juds- up .. their _ta;pbp1oal status. on the othe~ hand. -.ta-
pbJ-s1ea1 det1n1t1cm" ... the ppult at .. __ ph,.a1o&! analJ81s 1. 
not .. oontMd!.otiOll 1n .Z'JI8. It;, too, attas..u to the utUN of 
tbbtg8 1noludlq, however, the aul!1f1W1 oharaoter of real1tTI 
• 
and not the univocal uadeNtand.1ng of a log10al d&t!n1tlou. fie. 
i!U!1c!i= ~~tWtl!., theJlerOl'e, 1a used 1ft th1a. theei. to mean t 
Ol'1tologlcal statue td a o.ptain NnS* tit be1ngs (in this 0 .... , a1 
11!!!a ~ae) in 80 h.r ... eaoh of tbo •• b4linga 1n !!!!. P.Z; p-
•••• e .... p~lpl. whtoh 18 aulogoua to .~ pl'lnolple 1n an-
I 
other (llv!JlSl th1nEh And a _taph,-.1eal d.ef1nition, toumted ... 
1t 18 upon the ~8,.. of thinS-, can only beanalosoua., Just as, 
whlJA the .. Mally ens. no UR1wNal as such. theN 18 a found .. 
tlon 1n H-allty foZ" universals, .0 ala. theN 18 a toundatloa 1a 
the outologteal statu. .r thJ..ngB whtu .. b,."lUe" ean be predloawd 
" (o~ not) or' all or them. Evon though the Itt. of each 11vL-,g 
th1ng 18 radloall1 t.U.tf'el'ent from that of every othe.r 11 v1:ng , 
thins. st111 'theJle 18 something the ...... oundum. iu14. 2hJ,a 
Halllat! .. 18 1!Ihat I twm a _taphya1cal definition. 
ftapeN.tlonal de.t1nltlan" must be dlstJ.Dgu1shedt it 18 to be 
d1at1ngu1ehed ... that wb1ch .1s .. prlac1ple of knowledge trom that 
whloh U a oonclualon. It 1s ~Z thltough an analp18 oZ the 
opeNtlone ot .. th1D,g'bbat 1f$, flu!'1'1," at 80J18 1d... or t ta natuN 
(the e.xpl'fllJa _thad. of th1B thea!.).. In this •• nse, the opera-
tional det1nlt1on adequately 4~,.o%'!b .. "al1t'J as 1t appea1'l'8 to 
the obael'i'Mr. '.l'hutt. UD is .. th1ng which nOUl"iahea .1 tselt. 8Htf-
repl'Oduees, sens •• f desires. and 1a able to urlderstand. 'I do not 
intend to gift an,. phU_ophioAl cOlmotatlona to the tem ·opew.-
tional. clet1n1 tIm", It :c .lab to use 1t to _an only tho desc2'iptl 
of' a thing 1n tems of the _'1 it acta. 
!here 14 another t'JP8 oE opel'at1oaal d.et1n1tiOD., however. 
whioh I have called t.bf: "ccnst:ruot."S !he knowledge expressed in 
•• 
II .. using the tes "oaaatwct- 1n the -'1 suggested b7 
FatbJ,.. tcluM1'tan& 1». Introduction,!! the Phil-iii'.!! ~1y, Pp. 
262-268: ·OestructUR"1 awx.age o~ iM1 ' seveR! CSharao 
teriatl... It 18 t.1ret o:raU ...... t the le .. 1 of 801ent11'1. 
knwledge 1Ih1eh 18 0'lU' ma1D cOIlOem here ........ lect1ve (ftabat:N.C-
tlve") •••• 
·See.til,., o one tJIIUC tural knowledge of. the real api... by 
l'&tlODal induction. (Italics hiB) 
"~1'dl.." and taoat o~cterl.tloan"lt COl'18tructural knowl-
edge 1. 1ndll'8et,. that 18, the knowledge at one thing in t ... of 
another." And 1n his Phl1,osol>!ll of H:!!!a Natw.-e, P. 391: "1be 
& 
th1a det1n1tian Is indirect and adds a "med,1um.ft to dlI90t CODDOn-
•• n8. ebaeZ'VatlO'D.J an4 because the • .treot .O't this .medium re_1n8 
1n the oODCluslon, th18 t,pe of det1nition 18 called oonstruetuX'-
al... I'otl •• that there !!. kttowledp sA !StUtZ: 1t 18 p ... l •• 17 
with real thlasa that the ph'p101a', t"" eaapl.. 18 coneemad. 
But beoana. the ph,.So1."ts teohn1q,ue laolu4ea laboratOl'7 control 
the readbga or 1u'~_, .. apeotal _~odolo87. l' O&1mot but 
&.treet the "JPe ~ knwle4g8 he bu. PhJalo., then, 18 a .ca-
pletel,. o .. truo~l Hlenee bl thta ..... In "clet1n1ngft kinet 
10 eMl"gJ. te exa.mp18" .. ... lit 84oe18 ... t1_ S distance," there 
18 no atteapt to UD4.NU:n4 the u.tuN o~ .nerD' nor to tathca 
cmtol081oal reaUtJ' of ~ operatlou pr04U01ng such _.~. 
Bather, "%'8118 oona14e1'e4 onl:ru 80 rar ... the m1n4 8an _the 
._leaU,. ~ 1ta: -.n11'estatIC118. ""1'711'0- in the de.crlp·-
tian o£ •• 2-D' is a q;u.antl''1' 1t has l'lU'llbe:r-ftlu. Again, the 
, 
expe~ntal p8,.oholog1at will ~.~ f!l.!!ilQ1'J.8 1n te .. of tM 
••• and. oan •• q~ o£ the .8 ~Ntlonal 1D.4uct1on oan be .een 
in tba .... -.p1e.... ID ... cue. 1t .... to be p.alble to 
elSah .. _ ,be teolm1que or lna'bl"Um$nt ~_ 1Jhe .tateaent ot the 
ooncluslon .". a. turth.,. a4 ...... ' 'but 121 v.", ""7 other 1nstanoea 
tbe teebl:dque .... 1Da 1ft the ... lul_. Inothe~word8. not on1 
-18 .be pl"OOe4ure an 1nd1reot one J the ver, knowledp 1 tsel.t gaine 
througb.auoh .. technique 18 1t •• lt 1nd1reot, v con..atl"UetuNl." 
!'hI. 41at.lnotlan 1- to be oaapared with 'bba. _d. by laoques Marl 
tain in !be RtI£! •• t)~ Jg!OW1.". be __ eaptn .. ';ttl0 and anano-
_t10 knaiI.a:s-_ Miapa,.. ft!that work 1. relevant to this 418 
cu •• ian • 
• Lou18 lI. SeU.lb.e Phl"oal Wo.pld. P. Blak1aton'. 8<111 ad 
00., Ino. Pbilad$lpnla.%§. 'p_ 111. 
bodily ohanges produ.:e4, aome q,uantltat1ve el8D1$'nt 1s chosen to 
ll'ePMsent the natuNot emotions. A eonstl"Uot, then, 1s an ex-
pM_.ion in quantitatIve to~ of whatever is meuUl'tlble in an 
observable object. fhi. meaeurement 1s used u If 1t "presented 
the WJ!1 :nature or the object. fhe oonstruot ie muoh Uk. what 
Mar! tain _ana by tlemp1Jt1!1Qlog1oal. anal,..I .... 
Il'l apeaklDg ., -.p1.r101og1cal cal,..1. oztexplanatlon 
we haye said that aueh anal,..!. deal. w1 th real pos8i-
bl11tl •• or obN.,.tlcn and ..... Ul\'8m8n., w1th effectu-
al physioal ope.tlona. $'he pemanent possibilIty ct 
, ... :1bl~ Ye.-Ule.tlm ana BUUJemellt playa the s .. 
pal. heN u ••• ence d.oes to]} the philosopher ••• 1t 
8Ub8~1 'UM8 to'l} it and take. 1 te place ..... 5 
Ph11oaopb1ea1l7, the d1ft.,..nH between the cestruot and t 
••• ent1al.. metaphreloa1 d..tin! tion 18 the presence or the jud.gmen 
cd •• paatlon., the 1nteUeotual paaap1n8 of the tact that eve:r,r 
agent .a such 1 •. :11\ ~~. We w1l1 ••• more or th1a u we proceed. 
Let me just _'tate he. that the distinction beWeen ~ ,,-pes of 
de~1nltlon 1s baaed upon the distinction between process an4 
ope N.t 1 on. To 8Ubmlt the material thing onl,. to measurement. 18 
to beoome acquainted 1f1~ the material conditions undor' which the 
agent 18 act1rag; the.. aN the material. process.,. of lit.. Aa 
8'1lOh. tMS. PJlOO&S ••• aN the 4 .. 1n of the ph,aloal •• 1entlat. 
!'he tthOW'" of the •• pl'OCes.o. is the only lIo._ue.'" 1n which he 1. 
intel"&8ted. !!lus, to ea.y that .. Hllv1ng thiIlg 18 an objeot which 
, 4" 
,,111 ab&wb W'J,d syntbesize 8u'bstanee." is to d •• cr1be operations; 
but 1t is to deser1be ther.l in ter.tllS Qf.' the experimentally abeerv 
Pl'O(UUlS&1'5 of' .terial l1.fe. Such a dot1nltlcm describes _terial 
'Vogetative lite .. but nothing more. 'U81ng the aame observation 
ot nutl'1tlan, the phlloeopMr 18 able to •• paftlte the aot ot 
nutrition consldeNd preo1sely .. a an act, tram the mate1"'1al mo-
tiona that .ocomp&lJ' 1t. TIl!.s latter understanding ot aotlvity 
18 th$ tlrstty,pe of opG.N.tlcm.al definition: that which leads to 
metaph'J81cal bowl.elge .• 
!BE PROBL1.f4 OP LIPB. lP?Om tho.e 'Or1.t eonaiderat1ona, it 
shoul4 beg1n to bee .. apparent that knwledse or the trwl nature 
ot th1n8* u seU1Na mel.ea.. lINt "d • .t1n1tl0A8- we poss.ss are 
desoriptions ot th$ wa7 $h1ngs OpeNte. It la, of eOUl"15e, tl'lrou. 
observation or a th1ns'. operat1one that .. 0(88 to know wM.t 1t 
II • 
ls, "-"17. howeVO', 18 that step .v.~ tully _de. Whet1' it 1. 
mad.e, Wluall,. tbe reault t. a 10810,&1 claa.ltlcatlon of man,. 
under one, wh1oh# u sueh • .finds no axacst OOl.Ulterpal'f; in 1'8al1t,._ 
ftJ.e 1M1;jlt into the nature or anJ'th1na, then" in 80 tar as that 
nature 1. real, 1s tru17 dU1'1e'UltJ and the nature of 11t'e 18 
probably the prtm. example o~ this d1tttculty* 
We 1t1 manit •• ted in ope:rat1ons and movements It W.~ .. 
s1ats all ettorta to "stabilise" it 1n a emoept. Lite 18 d,nam-
10, it 1 ... (uatinw,*7 of ex1stenoe 1ft a special wa7. Ute 1. 
observable pr:1me.r117 .s oameotedw1th matrter, 1.1t8 1s tber-etore 
8 
in someway measurable. All or thea. a.epeo t8 or lit. have resul-
ted m two main distortions ot the natUl."e or lUe. !he tint 1. 
tQ consider lUe as .ssentially opeationJ this has two torms, 
both d.enying substantiality, but the one being paD-vitalistic 1n 
terms ot a vital tol1C~ aDd 1'121 as ~ essence at all reality.6 
and the otJlel!' OVtu:"17 atel'lallstl0 1a stressing the process or 
natUJlO 111 telVUJ ot _tioD in the st:r1ot sens •• 7 The' second 418-
tonion 18 the :reduction of vi tal operations to mechanical pro-
oeas •• without nec.a.~17 denying the aubetantiality at the 
agent.. ~ .. a". the1'etore. thfte pl'Oble. t. ~ raced and an-
_red in anal.7&1ng the metapbysical status of 11te, 'l'he tiNt 
18 a question at 8thOd, Is a metaph,aieal analysi. to be 11m1t-
ed to what. 18 _".U8~ In material. things? OJ- in otherwOJ'ds 
and JIlOM d1reo'bl1. What '8 the val141'y or the jud.s1aellt of •• p ..... 
rat10ll' seoe4lJ', Ie the,.. any juatlt1eatlO'1l t .. positing the 
" 
reallt,. of ~h1D8 but operation and at tbet _ ... tUte pre •• nina 
the .Y1~nt d)'D&l'l31c ella_eter ot 111'.' P1U11,-, Doe" the philo-
eophl0 _thod ftft'lmt oOllOlud1ng to tb8 eld.at.ne. of a nali ty-
(ll"e) that 18 abcq 'Cn. 11m1tatlons ot att •• , time, and change 
and that at the su. time cl._ not exclude :matt.,.., timet and mo-
t1011t 
6S •• Henri Bergson, L'.,YolutlO1l ONalnc!, Chapter III. 
"C:reat1on et evolution. .". 
'1S •• Altl'Od B. Whitehead, !lode. o~ !h!l!it. Ohapte!t III, 
"''the (hIdep o~ la~· and .. pee! .. XX,. 5. I .... Ie. 
9 
!HE DIVISION OF SOIENOES. '!he,. 1a noth1ng laOM evident 1B 
the NaJ.m r4 soiene •• than the eumtualon that can m.8ult f:rom an 
1nadequate dietino'lliQt1 and l'eoogn1tlon of toJilmal objeou. c.e 
and the 8ame eubj •• t 1. able to be t" .. ted undeJt a number or dir-
ferent asp.eta and .tormall ties t Mch oonstltuting .. dltrennt 
scienoe. !hUll. _, atud1ed. by .. chemist 18 iron. hyd;pcgen, obi 
ride, eto. J a 'b101eg1at oonsiders him as CCIllPoseQ. of millions of 
living .en., the p8,..holog1st 8M8 ¥,n as: a blmdle or nenes, 
the ph11osopher calla hUs a ,..tional anl-.l, and so on, 1nthe 
various I.ieno... Doe. .ach aoi •• _, thereto"" d:et1ne "lII8ll" 
with a Hal dAttln1tlan.' Does "1"11 and. h)'dJ'Opn" .xPNS8 th. 
aame Nality u "buDdl. of nerve." or aeStational animal"' Let 
WI take our example ot the natuM 0'1 lite and. briefl,. exaaine the 
methocl ot cel"ta1a S.!eM •• in treatlq Uvina thlnga. 
I'he object ot o1ol.oST 18 the -.te»1a1 llnng thing preols.1,. 
" 
in '0 tar as 1t :1a _te.1&1 and. l1v1nS. t.rhe method of blo1oQ 1. 
dire.t ob •• :rvat101l and the use of expel'btenta. :No oonclusion 1. 
aee.pled unless l' oan be .. rifled e.xpel'1antally. B1elcgy, then 
studt •• llv1ng _ttep ••• peeiallr 1». 1t. ult1mate constItut1on: 
the oel1. All or its _tefta1a are objeots of the •• na... Mol 
gy 1. caneemed With :plat and anfmal l1re. and, indeed, because 
of 1 ta _th04, t t oan ask about no ethe:- tON of l1te. 
PayoholoQ 18 41 vlded into two_ill part.: ph11oaoph1cal 
Imd ezpen.ntal. PhUosophioal p.ychol087 1. oons1de:red a part 
of phlloaophy. It tl"N.te of the nature of man, a ccma1deratlan 
10 
in t ... ~ cause. both o:t man'. operations eQ or his 8ssent!al 
oonstltution. Ph1lesoph1cal PfJ7CholOQ. theJleto~, treats ot 
human ~lf. J 1t, .sMn. oulJ' to that 11t. whoa. principle 18 a 
soul" and, .". pl'OPel-l,., a ratic:&\al aoul.. Ex.pe:p1mental pay-
. cho10S7, l1ke blolou,la a measUJ:l!ng aol, ... _ Ita method i. 
ob •• M'Iltion and the. 'WI. ~ exPel-'imenta. It titters from biology 
in tbat what 1t obaeM'$8 and measurea 1. the psychic stat. of the 
I1v1ng ~ in questlan. EXperimental p8,.eholoQ 18 eOllcemed 
nth the ma.n1t.8ta:tlOD.&t of vit.l opel'G.1;10118, mON precisely. the 
matenal and ph,.loal lIUd.festiatlO118 o£ l1te..-proc.ssea. Thi. 
doe. not __ tha1; the P87Chologia' dM. not judge upon spiritual 
entities" It does meu that .ueh a judgment 18 p ..... d 1n. t.~ 
or eonatl'UCta. '!be ltlntell1gena. q.u.otlon"lt 1s a constJl'Uet. lfh1a 
_~tleal ,uant1ty 4Oft8 not measure the ilItell.e' of a epu!t-
ual be~J 1t MPNa.'.'lbat 18 .aaUll'able tn such &ft 1I1te1-
• 
loe.'. wol'k1l1S ot Genaln px-obl .... 
file phUoaoph7' of MtuN. too, 1s conoerned with living 
things .. but not 0Dl,. 1a 'their aspect or t:l vIy_ the ph!loaoph7 
of natUM 18 .-14.2' 1J.han any ot the above •• 1eno •• J 111 tut, the 
high •• ' -tase ot the philosoph,. of MtruM embrac •• at least in 
pan a tield of phlloaophIoa1 psycholQgJ. !he philosophy ot 
natuN itself, howver. 18 also 11m1ted 1n the extent to which it 
studI •• being. !hi. soienoe OQ1'lSlders only mat.:rial beIng) :yet 
It includ •• an ana.1,..U ot the causes of material beIng and. so 
pNp&rea the \1111.7 :to. a hlghe7 .olenoe. 
11 
The sotellO •• consIdered thus tar,. as most otber sciences, 
are 11m1ted by their formal objects to .. can81del'&tion ot only a 
part of being. !beN 1s anothel' science whloh cOllsldel"S being 
U such; t.h1. 1. _taph,.alos. The object of __ physics 1. be-
ing 1n 80 tar as it 18 being. Thi8 dlet1ngu1ahes metaphysics 
t:POm bioloQ, which oonalders be1D8 in So tv as 1t 1. material 
and l1111nSJ tl'Ol1 P870hology. which otm81deN be1:ag 1n so far as 
1t i •• entient and manUestIJ intellection, ~ trom natUftl. 
phl1osoph7. which c .... 1ders being 1ft eo ra. u 1t 18 material 
and aubjeot to _tlorh~ Metaphplca ltuell.. the nature of What 
1t _ana to exUt J and existence is exP"s". in many -'18. Two 
of the ways or mod.. of enstence aN 01&881£10d aa l1ving and 
non-living. NOW theae aft logical clual:tloatlona ot "aJ. th1nge 
when we have e.mined the meu,phyalcal atatu. of the be1np l'$p-
Naented in those c1aultloatlona, .. w.l11 find that tbe1"e 18 as 
• 
gNat .. dirt.rence between the liVing thlDga themaelve. as tbere 
1s bet.Mn tho •• oOfttra4lot."le... And yet, as .. mentioned be-
ton, there 1. aODlltth1q 1n all I1v1na th!.l'lp whleh validate" 
such .. ola •• 11"1catlon. fh1s Is the analogous character or 11te .. 
As ... ball •••• 11te, sblce 1t 18 nothlng but a special. mo&t 01" 
being, u analosous When Rid ot the dl.tte:went iMd •• ot o.1nSJ 
f'urthell' .. the _taph781oal statue or each 1ndlvldual in a part1ou-
la:r saa. of 11.t. 1s analogous, and not univocal, to that of 
e'V,,!'1 other- lndlvldual. 
In line with th!s d1atinctlan ot .tonual objects, *ri.ta1n 
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d1at1ngu1ahea tl:l.Ne types of biological knOflledge. 
Fint of' all there 11'111 be an Gq)irlemetrlc or physIco-
matnemat10al b1ol0S1. a biologr which w1l1 tend ult1-
matel;r to otter a mathematical 1utol'Pfttatlon of sensI-
ble data ••• beu1n.g on what _., be oalled the material 
conditioning ot lite. the physloo-chem1oal meana of 11te • 
•••••••••• * ••••••••••••••••••••••••• ~ •••••••••••••••••••• 
'!b6 third. tJ'pe .t \d.ologleal 1m_ledge 1s this ,hilOllOih1-
eal.1 . .••• which 1s a PftJ?tloulaXt ohapt.". 0 m 
P1i!l:oao . o~ nattu.. and in wbJ.eh corte.pta w111 have tbel2* 
full bl" 191b1e. fft1gh'b, tMlxa whole. apecul..atl ve value 
wi thcutt U1'3' tW'01rJs back t_ftl the .ena... In it explana-
tioa .. 111 be _ought 1n teme of a ra,1aOll· (1.atl'e o:zt prmcl-
ple of intellIgibility and ot ••• a.~':~.8 I. : , 
FurtheJ". be,.cmd and above the ph1108opby of uture, there is tM 
_tapb181cal .. pp~oaeh .... intend to take hen_ 
!boM 18 a method fd 1nv •• tlgatlon lUI.d In the plqe10al sed.-
enoea that 1s not to be 11m1ted to thOS8 aolano •• but; belongs to 
science a8 auch. fh1. method baa var10ua names; uauaU7, it 1. 
called -isolation.a under this method. the aclantiat bal.atea 
or a.paN.taa ;trom Ita env1~nt the pa:rtloula:- element in whloh 
he ls Udiel'e,ted. ISolation ha$ two _in tOX'ml. The first i. 
the .eparating out of known elements in ol'ld.e~ to study one ot 
thoae 81emenu in ,. t.elt., fhue, the blo-cbfQ1st examSnea the 
amount 01' prote!n 1n a .ewing o£ salmon. The .econd f'om pro-
I I 
11 
c.ede by way of negation. When 8.m1ninga oertain substanoe, 
tor eample, tor the oause ot a diBa ••• , the soientist dlecoveftJ 
that the p:re •• nce ot three known tutors, w, x, and '1. in other 
substances _c ... ioned no disease. ne, thel'efoN. ooncludes to a 
fourth 'aetor. a. d1tte1'8llt than the three others.. Upon eamin-
1ns the .ube~. be diaeovel'8 tbe caUle at the disease. n. 
has 1solatecl " 111 aepa_tins the ilap.'ent futOH, w, x, and '1'. 
t!'Om tbe whole subatanoe. In a sim1lar ma.nner, but 1natead ot 
miOl'OfSoopct op ape.iN'oope" the pb11oaophet1, WIlDS the me:S.ibt 
ot obse""tlon and N.t1ect1on, .. ~t.e8 caus •• from cond.1tlOlJ.8 
and canelwiN to the Qistence at the ".- h.oto • .from the in-
.utt1el4mC7 C'4 the obI' tutON to .ap1.a. the· observation. In 
this manJ'l.8r, ~l", the _taphye101an Judsea that a ll&Jl'tleular 
8ubaanc. 11 ... , not bMaus. 1. 1. _teJl1al and baa op4tNt10l'l8 
eonoamed with matter, 'bu'becauae " 1s wo .tom and baa ita 
• 
panloulaJl mod. of ex18tcmM aa _11 as its operations Pftc1 •• 1,. 
~eau.ae ot that fo_. 
It IIlSt be a'NalUtd that this tbeau 18 not part or the ao-
called ftlleehan1sa va Vi tal1em.,9 debawh !hi. Itdebate" ia taJ!' 
f:rom .. taphJ'81cal poun4a. Firat ot all, both meebanlata and 
Vita11sta recognl_ only mah2!'tal lIte: .eban1ate, 1naotar u 
the,. oans14.3? life to oonsiat of attex- in motion, v1 'ballets, In-
sot'u as the,. conalde. lire to apr1ng tztom ... aoz-t ot enepgy 
11 d' ... • F 
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that 1s not exactly pattex- and yet 113 material. srt:l'lie stems more 
.fxaomtbel~ method than .t~ anything elJle. Bleil" investigatIon 1 
bioleglco-psycholog1cal, using obs&xwvatlm-measuring techniques. 
The st1"8es is upon experiments} Dothblg is admitted except what 18 
verified In the laboNto:ry_ Such an attitude rules out any poss! 
blllty of an exPlanation: of life that would include a non-materi 
or even 801Jl .. aess lite. The metaphysician must o0D81del" such "-
.-, 
possibility b$cc4UBe h1s .field 1s the whole realm ot being. inolud 
ing what he can 1m .. , 01 God. It a,. -rr well be that a philoso-
pheI" oan. OOlIte to reoognize an· othel" than _t.~al oause ot vi tal 
operatIons without ~11clt17 recognising the existenoe ot God 
separated substanoe. J Hans Drleseh did just that.10 Moat of Ar1. 
tatle's p" ;Anima 18 3Ust that. 'l'his. however, it seems to me is 
0. l'Ctcogn1t1on of soul-life only) and the soul ls the torm of a 
material th1ng.ll When the ph1,losopber "oognizes the existence 
, 
or other than matel!'ial beings,. his anal:181. of lire is not truly 
metaphysioal unless he .t1n4s 1 t ver1fied in those other beings. 
For, the h1ghest .tom. of material lite touches the lowest ot the 
F t 
lOS •• Edward T. Smith. tlb Vi taUs., at Hans Driesch,· !he 
~~~Tt. vol. 18, PP. le&-a27. -
Ust 4' 1'hc!IIaa Aqu.1mla, In II s.nt.. 1'1, 2. 1, act 1: Ad. p~ 
ergo d1cend*. quod :lntelliotus non' 'negat't.l:r osee tonna materia11. 
qu1n det esee materia. slout torma substant1ali. quantum ad 88$. 
pr1mumJ et 14.0 opol'tet quod a4 d1vi$1onem mater1ae, quae oausat 
dlverea individua, 8equator etiam mult1p11eatl0 intellectual 
1dest anima. tnt811 •• t1vae. 
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ap1rltual.12 
S"ondly _ moat or the Mchan1I1U are rather united in their 
reduction ot 11te to phys1co-chem1cal actlon. 
Dur1ng the n1net.en'ih centul'J evel"1 depaz-tment of phys-
ical. aolen.. baa been tested an4 rO'tJ!ll4 u •• tu.l 1n the 
atud,. fd organ1. phenom.ena. and. at length we have won 
a certain measure or 8UCC •• S in 4.8cl'1.b1ng 'living 
matter. aa a phyalco-cham1ca1 8,.atem.13 
Reoall alao the text with whlch thi. paper' began. 1'be author 
(Smith) 1n thfl same a.t'ticle 8ays: 
C_tempO.X7pa.,che1ogy 18 a natuMl1at10 d1soipline. 
Ita lnt:rcduetoF,J text. are diacM.tl,. mechanistie; ita 
e.dwnced texts IU" bolder. Ita j0\U'Ul.8 look dmm 
their noa •• at aa1mietlc tem1noloS1, and ita beaviel-
thinkeR balta to assure U8 that theN must be tneuft,l 
eorrelat •• t 't0l!' even their 1'IOM elaborate construots ,.14 
The reason tor th1a at'1tu4e, of .ou~,u., 18 to be found in their 
method.. Baving 1'Uled out at the etart anythlng that cannot be 
meaa\U'6d. the MohanisD' phraSing ot the problem 1 ta.lf' 1s taX" 
tl*om :reallst10. 
list. th0ma8, .~ fi1bl"Um 4. Senau at Sen •• te, 1, 1, n. 4: -
Rerum autem, 1nt.l"Iio uk qU1!em ni.iXXlua P&i't!.' oorpel'18 est It ut 
PNbatn.1r tonio de Ari1ma: unde noa poteat oona1dera%"1 per oem .... 
oNtlOXl4m, vel applioat1on •• ad eol"P'Wl vel ad allquod organ_ 
oorporeum. .x1ma. an1m oonO""!o 8lus •• t in. anima # 8'Uml'DA aut_ 
.ius abatl"&ctl0 est 1n 8ubatant118 •• puetl.. Et 1deo prelete:-
11brum «l-'- MI. An.totela. n_ t •• it Ubrwa de' lntelle.tu at in-
telllgl'13IlI: vel al tMl ••• t, non pertineNt ad :.:olent1_ 
naturale., sed J!lM1a !! .t&ih.l.lc",~, culue •• t oonalderaH de: 
8ubstant118 •• paiii:[a. 
l~. J. BendeX'Son, "Meohan1am" Pht-1.oRhloal Revie •• vol. sa.." 
p. 571. 
1"Ic4mC1_ Sldth, p. 330. 
16 
Thirdly. theN aN two classes ot vitalists. The tirst is 
materialistic. the second, spiritualistic. P%'O£e •• o1' Rignano 
writes: 
Attempts have bH.n made to compare the assimilatIve 
process and the growth ot 11 ving substance ldlleh 
sometimes follOWlll w1 th the growth at crystals in & 
salt solution. The two proceSSes are, how.ver, 
substantially different.15 
Rignano sp.nds a book trytng to show the ·substantial d1ftereDce" 
between living and dead. processes. Hans Driesch spent man,. 'JGars 
exPep1ment&lly trying to prove the same thing. This one quota-
tion tram Riguno indloate. their d1fterenoe: 
Dr1e.cht$ fenteleclq' is represented, we repeat, as 
belng an agcm.t without a spatial seat, without a 
mater1al baai. and W1thout energetic potentiality_ 
Hence his comparison with the human intelllgenoe 
and will. far .tram 8impllfying his 1dea. only tends 
to make 1t more obscure, sinoe the tentelecily' laoks 
all the spatial, mat.~al and energetiC eGRdltlona 
wh1eh. aCGordIng to tho find1ngs of pa,.chology, are 
necessary far the functlon1ng or the ht.1.nUUl 1ntel11-
gence a:n.d wm themselves.l £)- , 
R!gn.ano, greatly des1l'OU8 of finding en eas~t1al dltf'erence 
between organio and inorganIc nature f does not make the neoesslU7 
conclusion to an 1aaater1al pp1nclple o~ life. but places hi. 
hopes in an "energetio vitalismlt - still quite matel"1al, at111 
quite ooneemad With • .treat. and not causes. Dr18soh doe. make , 
the neoeslull'7 oonclusion to an lmmateplGl. oause: the need for 
~en1o Rlgnano, !l!. 'fC!1~ure Of f,lre. London, 1930. p. 4. 
16Ibld., pp. 12'7-128. 
-
1'1 
an extemal. 1nf'lue.e to UCOWlt tor varlat10n in a $yste •• l"l 
And ".'. attemptlq to utab11sh th18 ooulualcm purel,. OD an 
ex.pe»imental bUls, Drleach tails to •• cape the 01-1t1018m of 
R1gnmo bee«WI. he 18 4eal1ng with Mn who consl~r .uUl"able 
.U .. ta to bt t~ 0111,. reality. I ..... :r U poaalbl,. the l"OasCll 
wh7 Drl.s.h •• work o01llelud1Dg. as l' does, to an immatenal prin-
oiple of lUe, haatal1ed to 1mpft8. m._t modem sclentlsts ldght 
be ireol.~ll ",caws. hAJ has attempted to meet them with their 01dl 
method. Ua1ng expeJ'iaente and meuUNMnM ups u'bertal 11v!q 
th1ngl, Dr1 ... oonolu44ta to a p,,1aclp18 that oannot be .. asured 
111 1taelf. 1'0 ..... UM that prb.J.olple 1n 1ta .tte.t. 18 to re~ 
the pobl •• to _te:pl6l baaea. .And. tbe •• _te:r1al baaea aM pr.-
el.el,. all that the modem 8clent1ate w111 a4m1t to be real. A 
stud,. ot the .tteeta or lIving opepatlona le tar tram. a study of 
caus... Henee, b101og and experimental p.ychology (adequately 
, 
tul.tl11lng tn.1 .... proper f\mctlorw) a" _'hodologlcally unable to 
ueertau the tJ:"Qe na1.-..1" ot 11te. 
I hope I have not appeaMd to belittle a:trI •• 1eMe. My 
pe1nt 18 tbat the l1m1tations of e .. on .olence must be recognised. 
lio 8cl ... can p%'ODOUDOe up_ the nat\U.'fe or anJ1;h1ng whan that 
selene. 18 methedolog1call,. comm1tt.d to an eum1natlon ot etlect8 
and con.dltlcm.a !!+Z- fhe ~ta ot that 8elence may .... 11 be use" 
b. dlacOYez-mg nature. J but to define att.,r the manner o£ a 
'* b 
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philosopher 1n Ul'mS of tho material conditiONS under whioh a 
11v1nS tm1ng 1$ obs8rtable 111 to fall into the construct-fallacy 
!J&ntloned betore. !he scientist gives an a.ellent d~uJcrlptlon 
of how material thing. appeap to operate. But an analysis of the 
ult1mate being and ne.~ of things belonga to metaplqs 108. Of 
its ver!'f nature, metaph,..1c. 18 orde* ._l!'da unde1"8tand.ing the 
ultimate p.PS.Dclpl •• of .. allty. 
A METAPHYS leA.L AlfALYS IS ADD DEFIlfITIOI' OF LIFE. 1'h.ua far 
I have atkllPted to give ... 1de .. ot What th1. the.l. ia not. 
-
I bave stressed the question ot _thod beeaua. It 18 from that 
vlewpout tbat moat m1aUJlderstUldtnp of metaph7Blce bave arlsen. 
Elpeo1ally .!no. the ts. of Kant, _taphJ'alo1 haa been denied 
an,. Hal-ft.lue. It 1. otten reduced to logic, the _" d18Cua81oa 
or mental o .. truota.. Ketaph7tl1cal analJ'8U. however, n •• ds no 
justlfleaticm When one lald ... tand.a what ie meaat by 1t. ''!he uk .. 
phJSlcal analys1. o:t I1v1rlg th1np wb1eh I _ USing h&re haa t],~ 
note. : pr1marl1,. t 1t 18 fhal.tio J trora tb1. t011_ (I) the 
p:P1ta&oy of ~r-,." and (3) the valld!t,. of the ju4SJl'l$nt ot •• para .... 
t1c::m. 
1. '0 flay that tb18 "'18 1s 'lbomistle 1. no' to sa,. that 
1t 1. not An.tot.liMn, pathes-, it 18 MO" thaD Ariatotel:1an. It 
one .... " to Mad en1'1 the ~ ~ he would. peJibapa * agreew110b 
H~ when be •• ye or Ar18totle. 
Soul 18 asol'1bed t. all bodi •• Wh ... pJil1J'Jolple of 
mot!. 18 1aberent 1ft thei;p 0Wl1 nature. In othel' 
WoNS, 1 t 18 to all organio bodl.a that Aria totl. 
app11es the term; to him the word .soult Ie sJl1OJl.Y-
mott. wlth the ward '111 ••• 18 
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To equate aaul 1I1th 11te, however, 18 to Ignore certain texts of 
the ~t!ihZ!lC~ and the Bthl0a.19 HeM life 1. divine and be'1ond 
the .tON of a bod,.. Whatever Aristotle _ant, however, St. 
!bama. 18 cl~ to e.tablish lite as .s.entiall,. independent of' 
body and able to belong .. in taet. pre-em1nentl,. .. to spIrt tual 
eubatance. 
2. fo eatabliah b.1a p:r1nclple. ot being, &r1stot1 •. , and St. 
thomas toUO'Ifing him. ued hi. obaervat1ona ot the motlane 1U'ld. 
change. 01' _ter1al 'th1ngs. Prom an anal.,..1. of cbenge they both 
arrived at the prlno.1plea ot be1nSI eubatanee and aCCident. ~ 
.ame be1llg _,. be 1.IU)(l11"1ed "acold8ntallrr wh11e remaining .8sen-
t1all,. the .ame.. A. ~el" observation and oonsideratlon reveale 
that there rauat alao be a OCllllDOn aubatratum tor a being that 
• 
c~ t1*Ol\ one su~'bane. to another. P1"CIll the •• two obse%'V&-
tiona of aco1dent and 81lhatfmt1al. abaft_. there were bom a 
rea111atian ~ tbe princ!.ple of matter and .torm in oomposite 
subatance. and .speo1al.l:J, and ~ senerall7. a realIsation of 
the principles of aot and potene7 extend.1ng to all being. !hus 
lSwl1l1am A. Uareand. A:r1etotl ••• PSnho10ifh. s. Sannen.8che 
and 00., London, 1902. p. D. 8 .... ::tio mucH sama statement 
in Hazamondts antol., "Aristotle's Doetrhe of "'''Xl{ a8 Biological 
Princ!pl.,· P8moloslc~ ~.v1e,.., vol. V. p.l60. 
l~. !l10., 11'1'1bS6, Mea., lO'18bl'1. !h.e •• wm becCl'l-
s1dere(t""Tatir. 
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tar A:r1stotl., and st. !hamaa With him. ' 
It .... ', howeve,p. that tr<>m the Dllme obae:rvatlons, St. 
1'hCGllll\ obtdta.4 .. d .. per 1mI!gh1; 1nto the full UqlOl't or e.ot and 
pO"beMy. ae,.0n.4 the p~olpl.. .t Bubstance and ao.Went, o:l 
matter .and. tom" 8t. !b ... recognl •• d ~ Pl'inciplaa of .sa.-.. 
and .ld.at.ace. A te __ " preol.. than ed.at.l1ce and one which 
I wW use l.t 1». !Atm, ••• ! -- Mat tMUlaMd., t .. PUPPH.a or 
We papep,. ...... , of e:d.atins.a 8be. 8t. 1'h_ ott_ 'et1p:ea 
111". sa the ~.~ of It,,1!l8 thtnga,SO l' would be .. 11 to ... to 
.ome und_"tan41ng _ What h. -- b7 ,,,,8
1
,- flU. I hope to at-
tau with ... clan1;,. 1n the OOl.'lNe of the 'beal.. At th.!8 
poi.t. h_"~, we .b0'al4 '17 to Nal1, •• to aome extent, the 
metap!q'81oa1 PJlt.ma.,. that •••• hal to1ft St. !h..... Ooneldep tb1a 
;'1 n 
kxt ~ th4t 8 ..... 
I J 
. .. 
21 as or ptJtency to ut. 
In another place. st. ThOJlAs says: 
Ex1ltence ( •• a.) 18 the e.otual1t,. ot every :rOlm 
or na'tllre; r~ l1elthex- goodness nor huma.n1t7 18 
alsn1tl.d .. twt1ng in act except 1n so ta~ as .. 
• ign1.ty that it • .nat. (eam. •••• ).. It is nee .. -
1.%7,1 theNtcU •• that tlii'"'I'CE'or exist1ng (oaae) 
:1 tael.t be CompaNe! to Oi!senee wh1ch 1s otheF"1$an 
it., as aot to poteac,..22 
21 
E$8~, then. 1. a pP1Bc~ple of created be1nS. It 1. "thAt by 
1I'h1ch" au eaa.nco ~t.. st. t'hoaas po1nta out the various -,.a 
111 whlch -that by 1Ih1chll (tUG eat) b .ud ~ aate .. lal things .. 
Fil'lltot all. lt 14 aa14 or the aubatantl.al to_... P%'~ m;!ltt~u:~ 
and subatantlal. r~ constitute an eaa.nee, the :rom 1s that by 
which ~ _tteSt ba$ ex1atenee. !be iatONat1cn or matter make. 
a _te~1al whole p~_t.l,. upaba ot receiving eaae. Secondly 
I 
g.uo ~.t. 1. aa14 or that 'by whtch a th1ag 1. what 1 t 1a: the 
eesenoe,e.g •• b.l_.~t7" hltber subataat1al ;tom no%" the 
• 
t t 11 
2lst. 1'hc.aaa. 8.,a.. I, SO. I ad. I. Ad _n1_. Die.Mum 
quod U .. t h~ ...... 1" o~ltl. ~ONM et matenu, eat 
ta.mel:l 1D eo aotua .t potea'tta. Q,uod qui'- m:an1teatum p,otest 
esse ex .... 1d.Rid ... :NJ'UIl _te~_. 1a 'lu11:l\1l Ulva1tur 
duplex 0011;>_1 t10. :Prima quid._ t01"Dli&e ., _ton... eX qu1bua 
ocm .. tl1;u1t~ natUl!"& al1qua." Na~ auto. 810 oamp_ita nOD. .at 
$UWll .s... ..d •••• ..t .. otua .1,.. UnA. lpaa u.tw.-a oompafttu:r 
ad 8\l'WR .... 8lout pot.tla ad actum. lubtJ"AOta .x-go matez-ia.. 
poalt.o ,u04 tp ... ~ aultal.kt flOll m _te~1a. a4h'u.e ~t 
o~tl0 tOl".llH a4 1p_ •• ase ut poteat1u ad act_. Cb 
tJlO8lattou U 8t ..... .,.. .., OR .:1 ••• _them •• 1D41 ... ted. 
last •• ~.8 ••• , Ii 3. 4, o. • ••• at utuaUtq .... 18 
t081lae ft1 _' .. oT a'&' 0.111 bQa11iU .. 1 human1t ... 81p1J'1 ... tur 
in _tu, m..l p:rout .1p1t1M ... u ••••• Oponet 111'- quod 
lpaUll •••• cmapaltet\1l:' ad ••• entl_ quae •• tal1ud &" ipso, slout 
utua a4 petentl_. 
.ssence iueU, or the.elv •• , make a bft1ng to be %"IIa11 the" 1. 
motu .. pl'ino1pJ.e" !I •• f¥lt/up 8fJS1i'DU. where'b7 .. thbg 18.23 
Ea*;8, .. a p:r1MlplA f4 be1Dg, H tha'-'Nb7 .. _tUM 111 
plaoed 1n the ol'der or _ .. 1 thinge. Metaphysio •• 1t it 18 ooa-
ceme:4 w1tsh real1 t,.. l'I.\lR take acoount of th1. prima,.". pl'1nclple 
of '"bls. I" 1. not .... n.. which I. the ob 3.ot or _tapb;yalea J 
1t 11 tlut mo4 • • 1 em.tenoe wh1ch thla e •••• e hal. fbi. atud7 
ot be1ng in •• fa%' .. 1t 1.8, athe. than 1D 80 tar 881t 1. same 
u-t1.U'e, 41.~.he. _Mph".!_ ~. other •• 1 ••••• 
!he ph11_opbJ r4 utv.Jre whleb "rltl.. Ita a_clu-
8.1_ 07 .... daR. Jlehra te the .~tll::tlA. a1at.-
.nc. whlch &1_ CD be atkJ.Md. 'bJ •• naat!. in 
OJIder , ••• t.blllh .. tea.ltteall.7 ., aN th6 ob-
jeGb. 1t at'U41 ...... not only " b.~ mode o~ 
..s.t ... bu' alAJo to _ow v...l» ....... 
_.ph,..l •• " hGWM'er. doe_ not wJt1ty 1N •• -
o1uelouln .... __ • 1'1_. ltD matbeatioa, 1n 
the ~tl_. "-~ ••• i It; '.0 ... t •• ·to the 
.o~tlb~ e.ateue 1Ih1eh ean be .t' .. ~4 bY' ..... Ue. ad l' , ... eo not to •• u.b11.h .o1etltlell1J' Wbat a8 the 8&llt1.H it .tu41 ...... tIl __ 1,. fit 
_tapb.78loa, tM belas te...",. to the tea pM41 .... _.' 
oNated aa4 __ .rs.al take:n u 'b4J1q ... nos-in .I'd •• t. 
know tMl. ....... n ,_. e. t. __ how the,. utI'. 
t. rue, teo, _~1.. .hould bow. to attala tMlr 
...-.• , 018_._, u4 the '- .... 1 .. br analog the 
list ....... X». I ~t" VIII •• , e o. * t'ble 1a emn1bu 
lU1. in qu1'bua •• r • ..,-.n10 ex -.uria et to.... e.t et1_ 
compoalt10 .. quO' e.1# et quod. e.t. In 0.,081t18 _ute. U 
_tena ., to .. quo •• t petest 4101 tripl1e1ter« ,.-at_1m 
4101 quo •• t 1, •• teJim& p.,.lI. q ..... dat .... -.t.r1.... P.t •• , 
.t1a 4101 quo •• , lp .... tuB •••• n41, •• 111 .. , ••••• alout quo 
oun1 t'uJI, •• t utu Gul'Nll41* Potest,td.am 4101 quo .at ipsa 
_tUM quae Mllaqu1tur _ o_3tmO\1<me t07m&. CUJl __ ria. ut 
~tu. 
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ens_noe ot that Which ensts 1mma teP1ally j which 18 
~17 aplrttual.24 
The lit. of a plant 1 ... mode of be1ng, tM l1te of an atUal. t 
11te or man aft mode. of being) the 11te or an angel. the 11te ot 
God a" DIOde. of behtg. 1'1 vena 1l1hl1 all},'\4~lIt guam~~8" .Ie Rill! 
na~.sa An4 -itt.- .lpl1'le. th1e UfJ,!I' .• but 1n u abstl'aot 
manMl'.86 the Mt\1.N of lit., then. belongs to .. stud.7 of uta-
pb.)1Jl0' J lite 1. to be alvell 11l .. panloulal', nth •• than pneMl 
way, the p~ 'tbat •• ae It.elf baa. POI', to 11ve 1s ... act 
. 1 II ¥, 
, ' 
c~ to the po __ " that 18 a. p.teat1&Uy all Te .ssence be.t 
that .IUI.noO ex1.t8. 
3. .h'om these conelderat1cma, it should be olea%- what 1. 
mdJ1t by a J~t ot 8eparat.lc:m.. Metaph'1s1cs, since 1t 18 the 
stud.,. of the nature of ~ in their tirat pl'1ne1ples and 
caWJ •• , m:uat - u ... point of i.X"J:1'R!l! athod -- prooeed by ".epa-
l'&t.1l:lg" tt. essent1al ~ th4 accidental, the causes f'rbm the 
c~ltlOi'Ul, the pJ'!nclplea fltarJ. the th1np cGruJt:1tuted b7 pr1nel-
pl... fhe J: ... '1,.. ~ at HpaftU_ 11 a. ocmlplex reaaOD.iJ18 
Pl'OO... wbel'8Ul b7 undeNt.rW1ns tlhat doe. not account t. .. par-
-
t1eu1.ut eaperi_. we .11 •• 0 the laloWleqa rd what does ... am:t 
tor it. PO!r .maple, .. be1ng 1. real PR.' be •• use ~ ita essence 
, . 
24Juque. *rttain.A P8tao.. !2. H! • .2bI!~ps. Sheed and Ward 
New Yorit, 1949, PP. 22;e!'. 




'amee 'hi. Mt-era te no mOlle than 1ta mtelllpbl. CODt .. ,), 1t 
1. Na1 beeausG l' bu D ut or ex1at1nS. xn th1G _,. .... -
physics aacenda to k:acMl.edge 01 tId,D.. 1. tn.1r oaWl •• , attrlbut-
1q opel'll'!'" t. pJllOPCtl- 8WPOU, Eve thovahthe metaphJ'alo1an 
begiu _ltm hu dlhet ope.1 ..... taba hi. atart tra:a u 
1iIl1&l.781a ot ._nal th1l\sa, and onl.,atter Il'UOh ft.tl •• t1on as-
.,.nda to pr.l.tw.\lplu tbat aM Jadel*D4.ll'C of _ttel',. 11 neb. there 
be,. OIl" th... pJ'iac1pl.a _)Ie attailled. ~ 1s able to tUl'fl to the 
whelA "abl fd "1na u4 u.ucte»8ilanct. to ,~ extent. at le.at. 
the c_tltutl •• ~Mno., and 0»8atd._ at all th1rJ.ga. 
to _._lucle w.. ftrat obapter: 
1.. ., prbta..,. Ia .... t_ .. ,. ah_ how a metaptqa1cal 
&J)&1,.,,1a .f lit. dlf'.teN trom atl7 othe .... 1,...18. DUa meta-
ph,.81eal 1m&1781a 18 s .. to be _ 1Da1ght intO' "_1 th.t.asa, not 
• cuw18tJltlCtl_ ffl the Jd.ad but the tJ.-ul, ~ the ad..mi'a ... uUv-
I • • .. 
1t7 wh •• eO'Dl'lMtloa nih _U" e~71 ... 1s "*4117 aM. 1n a 
•• :asa1 bal181 .• • t kttow1e4p ... haft ... tU place of __ • 
Pb:plo1 a.ul.J'.d.8 1. the ftb.leR1'GhJ'" fit the aeleu .. moft bJ wbat 
1t 18 Jl1J11 the NlMbbg papa aft 111~ to 1M.l .. t. wha:t; 1t 
18. 
-
8. •• haw .ea bow it 1. po.elb1. to haft pb.11oaopb1oal 
knO'Wle4&..~J.' thaa mdvocal •••• _'lal det1Jd:tlou. tM Judg. 
fle1'1t of •• paNtle will lea. us to an "'~!ll~ knowledge· or the 
nil tUft of 111' •• 
3. ~ method 18 Ut 1nteU1g1ble 1Bductl_ boll thoe_ th.l 
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that al'e evidentl,. liv1ng. 1"b18 1nduc\1ve appl'QaCh to the meta-
physical probl_ of 11t$ gives U$ a basU in fJx.p$plence trom 
\fh1ch by sepal'1lUng causes tPOm OGlld1t101'U1 we w111 be able to 
attain a knowledge ot what perta1M to 111'. as such. as a manner 
of en. tina_ 
CRAPTER II 
!!l! Start!!!i Po1n~: !B! PhYSical W.o~l~ 
Prom those things that are eVidently living, we ean 
understand to whIch things it belongs to live and to 
which It does not belong to live. It 18 eVident, how.v.,.." that to live belongs to an1mals. For. 1 t 
1s said (.De Elantla) that 111'e is aanlteated in 
anbtals. '"'"'fh'e"f~, it 1s. accordIng to thIs that it 
1s neoesaal"J to d1au1ngulsn the 11v1ns t~ the non-
living" namely, 1n that respect in which aninaals are 
sa1d to 11ve. this aspeet 18 the eme under whIch 
11te 1s tint ot all manifested, and tmder. which the 
last traoes of 111'. "main. -For,., say that an 
animal 11 YeS, ttnt ot all When 1 t begins o~ 1 kelt 
to have motIon, and the animal !sjudged to live just 
so long as such _Uan appear. in It. When, however. 
it no longer has any motion of 1tselt, but is moved 
only b,- another, then the an1mal
1
1S said to be dead 
on acoount of a tailing of lite !II 
flOlEllENT AS INDICATIVE OF LIFE. fb.el"$ 1s no better v1ndica-
tion ot the real-value 01' metaphysio. than to follow step-b7-step 
• 
that induotion whereby the principle. or metaphysios are gleaned 
from expert.nee of the world -- whether ~ pet-Sonal experience 
1St• Thomas,!_ ~., I, 18. 1 OJ R •• p(mdeo dlcendum quod 
ex his quae man1f".$te V1vunt, aoeipere POSfiJUDlUS q'Uo:rum sit 
vivere. et quorum non .tt nvere. ViveN autem Mnlteste animal1 
bua conventt. Dlottur enta, (De .l-!lantlB) quod. V1ta 1n an1mallbua 
manttest. est. Unde secundum nIue! oponet dlstlngueN viventla 
a non vlventibu8, secundum quod animal!a dlcuntur vlvere. Hoc 
aut_ est in quo primo :man1testatur vita, at in quo ultIma rG"" 
manet.. --Primo autem dloimus animal vi veN I quando inclpi t ex 
Be motum habere, et tamd1u judlcatuJt animal vi vere J quamdiu talls 
matus 1n eo apparet J quando vero jam ex Be non habet allquem 
motum, sed movetur tantum ab all0, tunc dioitul.- animal mortuum. 
per defectum vItae. 
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2'7 
or that of another. To talk about the nature ot 11fe is meaning-
less without having analyzed what lt 1s 1:!! l;lvIn~ things whereby 
they 11ve. Suoh an analysis or oQ1l81deratlon consists 111 examin-
ing the tOl"!lD$ ot l1fe that are objects of our experience in order 
to det.mine the principle and source ot the vital activIty. 
!hore are three p088ibl.approaehee along this line. In the 
tl:rst place, thel'8 1. the scient!.t who scours the sea-bed look-
ing top the 81mpleat torm of lit. J he t.els that greate:v torms 
of 11t. aJIG onl,. elabo:ftLtions or att\oebae. file maIn ditf'ioulty 
with such an approach 18 * aa Anstotle points out, that there 
are many 1;b1ng8 which .. would be haN. put to to deo1dewhether 
they are allve or not, or whethe~ they are plant or animal. 
Secondly. there i8 the ra1mer idealistic ph11osophei1' who con-
side,.... lUe in ita tullest as 1t would be found. in God; only 
secondarily does he 'then apply Ullte" to creatures. l1l'1l.ess, 
• 
however, what i. known ot the lite of God 1s known. only after and 
because ~ knowledge or the lite of creatures, such a philosophex-
buildaeastles in the sky and has no hope of discussing :reality_ 
The third path 18 tollowed bJ Anatotl. and St. Thomas and con-
siats in examining lite as 1t 1s "most evident" to us. Since 1t 
is movement that gives us the ~1rst manitestation o~ lire and 
sinoe 1t 1s lack ot movement that in the last analJsis torces us 
to jud.ge that this th1ng 1. no longer l1ving, 1t 1a from an unde 
standing or motion itselt, oZ that speoial ''We of motion we call 
"actlv1ty,~ and of tbe principle and source or motion and 
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activit,.. that TI8 oome to understand. something ot l1re. 
Such an approach to the problem as 1s outlined above, renders 
Irrelevant a dlscussion alang the lines of M. Adlerts Problem ot 
, -
S;reo1es.~ Dr. Adler 18 interested in determ1n1ns the number of 
dlttel'ent species of things: whether the 1nan1.mate constitutes 
one OJ;J several specle'i whether the number of souls 1s more than 
th1"8e. fbere is great difficulty 1n deciding such questions, as 
Adle~ quotes Ar1stot1e to indloate:3 
Nat'tlre proceeds little by little rl"OlD. 111"e1888 to 
animal 111'. in such a way that it 18 1mpoaslble to 
detenune the e:aot 11ne ot demfu-catlon, nor on which 
side thereot an 1ntel'Jnediate :foa should 11e. IJ.'hUB. 
next atter lUeles8 tb.1nge in the upward scale comes 
the plant I and of plants one will ditter tram another 
as to it. amount ot apparent vi tallty.... Indeed. 
there ia observed 1n plants a continuous scale ot 
ascent towarda the animal. So, In the sea, thSl"e are 
eeX'ta1n objects concerning Which one would be at a 
loss to detem1l1b Whether the,. be animal 01" vegetable 
.... In regard to sensibility, some animals give no 
indioation Viha"OttTel" of it, whllst others indicate 
It di.tinctly.... And so throughout tbe entl~e · 
animal scale there 1a a graduated d1t'te:rent1ation 1n 
amount or Vitality and in capaeity tw motion. 
But what Dr. Adler does show and what Aristotle points out 1. the. 
there aN olasa1f'1oations t plant and animal. The qual1fications 
-
01' these elasses are known from those members which give evidence 
01' these qual!tles, so that a taUure to place this or that thing 
S.ortlmer J.. Adler. ~ Problem of Sp'cles.. lie." York, Sheed 
and Ward, 1940. - , --
3lbid •• p. lOS: Anstotle, Hist. An1ma11um, VIII, 1, 588b 
4-22.- -
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In one definIte clus 18 due to Ignorance ot the nature ot that 
thing. ~$ _ana that animal 11te 1s d1atlngu1sbable tl'Ql pIaD.-t. 
that husn lite 18 distinguishable tl'ODl antsl. Above all, it 
indicate. 'that there 1e a distinction of lite fram non-11te. Can 
sequentl,., the Nault ot our investigation Is not to give WI a 
rule wheNb,. we _,. decide what 10" ot l:J:vlng thing 'bbl. Ol- that 
material individ.ual 1s. 'lh1a 18 the .0* of the blcloglstoJl' 
zoologlat. Rather... are interested 1n determing What belongs 
to lite .. auoh. 10 that wbat ... • .. ,. w111 appl,. to lite wherever 
it Is found. W. begln, then, wIth life .. it i8 moat evident, 
and ... atteDQ)t to un4eretand ita lIJ:t;1mate nature. !he tint 
avid ....... obsel"Wt about 11te 18 It. connection 1If1.th motion .• 
, 
It 1. not, however. an: type ot _tlon wh1ch !ndicatea lite. 
Mottan laanalogoua .. a It 1. found 1n things. !he pria17 &nalo-
gat., motion 1n the atJ'1ot senae, 18 the utuallty of that whlch 
• 
e:.Uats 1n po_no,. and 1n 8. ta. ... 1 t 18 1n potenoy. 4 fbJ.8 type 
ot motion 18 the p1*OOe.s itself, the "'8l'7 ~lt1on hom • state 
, 
of potcm.eJ' to tha~ ot act. Its °realit,.· ocnalsu 1n the cont1nu 
OWl aotuaUz.tlon td a pot.Cl" lta "al1t,. 1. tbat .. o.t a th1ng 
.. hieb 1. on b _,. to bfl1ng· aotual. and in so tar u 1',.1, only 
"em the .aT' and has not .. yet been actualized. !hle type of 
motlon oea ••• when the new pel-teotion 1a gained, 1u real1t7. 
then, 18 of the low., t,"t 1t 1s tM aetual1t7 of an 1ap$rrect 
.. 
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being, that 1.s t 01" a being in potency. 5 Motion, in thi. ..nse. 
is "beeom1ng" l"athel' than "being." 'fhus. III building while 1t t. 
being bullt 18 in tlerl; 1t 1. lmpe:r1'ect .,1th1'88P80t to tbe 0<.'0.-
..... Ii. 
plated bu1141n6 which utat. !!! e.... 8uoh motion. 18 al1f&,.a the 
reault of 801111 otb ... activit,.-, Whether that other aot1v1t7 be 1t-
.elf motion OJ' s0m8'SbS1\8 else.. It 18 a1 •• ,.. the :result of some 
otb.e:r utlY1t'1, beoauae ita "alit,. OOlUllst. pHc1se1,. in the 
prooe.8 Wbel'8by. thing 18 reduced .tram poteno7 to aet. And noth 
ing is redueed t .. poteacy to ... , except; by sOIIethUlg alreadT in 
act.6 In othe~ .. 0"-. 'ih18 type of motion 18 alwa,. caused Jlby 
anoi;hel'." 1'IbatCtvel' 1. llOVed 18 moved. b,. something other. This 1 
the ty.pe of actlon to 1Ih1ch st. 'l'hQ1.'QaS Mte" when h. sa,..: -wh 
It 1. moved only by another, then It 1. said to be dead.8 '1 14ot1. 
1n tshe .tftct •• nse, tbIm. the act ot that which exists in po-
tene7, 18 ... ld ot n.on-ltving things in 80 :t"ar aa the,.. a~ ~1ng 
• 
moved b7 .ome~ e1C1.. theNtO,., It 18 not an eum1nat1on. of 
th1a t,-pe 01" motlon that will lead us to an un4eNtand1ng or lite 
A •• con4al'J' analoga" o£ motion, 1n a wide •• nseot the teN 
• 1 1 t l "' Is,... ftlatllU, !. a., .1, 18, 3 ad 1: ..... motus eat actus 
mobilia.... @8t:'J aotuJ lmper-teotl, s.ilicet u1atent1e 1n poten-
t1a ... 
Sst. thorau, .. lD.. VII ,Meta •• leot. I, 118'18. .lotus aut •• 
natul'all'ber pl'iol' Vt potin,r.. Bt a1mpl1citel' loquendc priOJt 
tempore. quia non mewetuX" potentia ad aotum n181 pel" ens aotu. 
7St • thomas .. 1 .. .!a-I I, lS, 1 0 .. 
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1s more properly oalled "aetlv1ty."B the term uactlvltT' 1. used 
to indicate the self-possession or tb1s typo ,of motIon.. Activit,. 
18 analogously called -motion" because, as motion in the stl'1ct; 
seneff i8 the aot ot the one moved, act.!. vlty or operation 18 the 
aot of the ona act1ng.9 Activity, however, is the act of a being 
which exiata in aot and 1n so far 88 it i8 in aot. fh1a 18 the 
mean1ng of the Mrm - •• U .. tn;Otion.u fbis type of' motion, act1vity, 
haa Ita SOU". 11'1th1tl the being ita.lt. !he te. ·.sir .... motion .. " 
tben, baa two reterences t 1t reters botb to the sO'UJlCe of' the 
motion and to 1 t8 teN. When a. being or 1,.elf' begins to move 
It.elt, it 18 sald '0 11ve. Now. the aCRl!'Ce of the motion 1. 
able to be only the aatint,. of the behlg, it this 80u~e ot 
motion W:r'$ motion in the striot sense, It would be caused :t:POm 
wIthout, and we would not have an example of' .elt-motlon. What 
1s meant leonl1 thi8, that a dist1net1on m.uat be made between 
• 
motion1n a being that 1s HOelved freD. outside (and this ... have 
called "motion 1n the 8t.101; sensed) and motion that ia trona. the 
being It".l1' (and thi. we bave oalled If .. otlvlt,.·). !hi. 18 a 
minimal d1stlnotlon o£ lite t .. non-ltte, but it 18 an important 
II t 11 •• 
81t. ~omaaf 1_ !!., z. lS, a a4 1. 
9St. !houm., I._ 1'h., I, 18, a a4 11 unde quia motua eat 
actual mobill. ,. •• cUndi""" .. ot!o inquantum eat actus operantis, d1el .... 
tUt- actus .jus, ex haG 81m111tudlne, quod stout motu ••• t actua 
mob1118, ita buJuamcd1 e.etl0 •• t aoWe agentia, 11ee' l'ltotus att 
actus imperfeot!, 8cl110' exlatentl. 1n potent!a, bujuamod1 
autem. actio 81t aotus pert"'!. 14 est existent!. 1n aow. 
as 
ACTIVITY. We have pointed out that sel.t-motlon or actt vi ty 
18 the sign ot lite. Seoondly, we have 8.en how motion in the 
strict s.ns. has it' 80\U'Ce either in another extr1nBlc motion 
<as when one billiard ball in motion imparts motion to another 
billiard ball) 01* in an aot! vi t7 (as when a 1i v1nS being impart. 
motion to a material thlDg).. Activit,. itself. however. 1. ot two 
typGs.l0 F1Nt or all, there 1s the actinty that has ita SOUNe 
in the agent, but proceeds from that apnt and produoes an effect 
outside of that agent. 'fh1s type at aotlvlty 1e oalled "tMD.-
sienta ft thi. i. the activ1t,. whioh 18 ot the predioament "actian. 
Aotion i8 the perteotlon or the thins uted upon. rather than 0.1 
the agent It •• lt: 8;01;10 •• t !! ,aaso.11 .u weh, with regard to 
ita term. this action 18 not distinguished from motion in the 
strict .. mae when coneemed with _terial th1nga. Th1s transient 
actlon 1. the pas8ion "auf'tered" by the patlentJ it i8 the ohange 
or motion whioh 1s produced in a patient but cona14ex-ed a8 
r _ • ••• 
lOst. !hemal, S1.'lllest. i1'l!. do l'otentia Dei, III, 15 OJ 
Duplex •• , .otiol quae'lUi qUae conal.II' In-ypao agent. at eat pe:rt.o~lo at actus .sen'b1a. ut inteUigere. veUe, 8t huju;mod! J 
quaedu vere quae egNd1tn.u:- ab agente in pat len. ext:r1naeoum .t 
est per.te-otl0 .t actus patient!8, .lout oaletaoere, moveN, .t 
huju8lDC41. 
118t. fhomaa, In I ~nt., <60, 1, 1 ad It Operati0 enim agen-
t!. qua.dam EUJt ut"nua!eu 1n affeotum •• t haec ppopr1e aot10 
vel pae.l0 d!cl~,.t tal! actionl .emper respondet • conveNO 
pas.lo, undo 1nyen1~ caleraetio aotio et eale.taotl0 passlo" et 
Similiter ereatic aot10 .t oreatic pas.10. 
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received. tram. the agtmt~12 !heN are two conclusions .. may d:raw 
from thi.: 
1. !ran.lent aotion considered in ita t1na1 cause 1a the 
same .. motlon in the atMet senseI that 18, 1t 1. the act ot an 
impert'ect belng. the pel'teotion of the th1ng moved.13 
e. But, tl"8n81.nt aotian conaidered 111 1ta et.tio1ent cause, 
namel,., .a Pl'Oo •• dtng from a being, 1s dlat1ngu1shed: .1the:. it 
18 a tranam1tted aotion (aa motion in the _':riot •• nae) 0,.. it is 
initiated action. ftda latter belongJ to a lIving being. And 
78t, beoaue. vanalent aotion belonss to both living and non-
llvlns th1nga. 1t 18 not thi8 t1P8 01 utlnt, that repl"esenta 
the natuJ.le of 11:t •• 
!here 1a a second t1P8 01' aotiv1t'1 Whioh baa Ita sOUI'Oe in 
the apnt and NJDa1na .1~ the agent, ~l"t.cting none but the 
agent it.elt. !hie aotlv1t'yl' called "immanent actlon," it • 
• 
12St• Thomae, 8. i- t 1, 41, 1 ad a. • • ., actio .ecundum 
Pl"imam nOJl~nl. imp_I on.e. imporlat o:-lg1nem motus. Siout en1m 
motue, PJ'OUt •• t in mobIl! ab allquo. dicltup pU810, ita arigo 
ipalus aotuB, s&oundum quod 1ncipl t ab alIa et term1natul" in 14 
quod movetur. vocatur actio. 
lS.e• Xote 9. 
l'st •. fhoaaa, .!t. J)~i. !!. V ... l.te. VIII. 6 o. Re.· 
pondeo die.MUlI, q~lupl"x est acl!o. sa quae pl'ocedit ab 
agente in l'em e:Ue:r1orem. quam tranemutatJ et haec eet slcut 11-
lUldna" J quae et1am Pl"OPne actio n<*1natur. Alia vep£) actio 
est, quae non pt-ooedlt in rem extel'10relll, .. 4 atat tn "4'P8Q,,~~te 
ut pe~.ctl0 ip.ius J et haM proprio dlo1tUl" opeJ!&:tlo, et hUt ... ,>. 
e.t .1out lucere. 'v'''' •.. ,. ,\ ,:.> \ 
ever, there 1s a distinct10n to be made. Pb-st, theN 18 that 
action wh10h begins and end. in the agent but is the action ot 
one put of the agent upon anothe%' paR_ !h1e action 1s l!1J1Ulnent 
in that 1t Nma1na within the agent, but 1t 18 t1'8.l'Ullent in 1ta 
ettect, 1n that one part aeta upon another. !hi8 t»8 or aotlon 
1s moat ev1dent 1n _terial llving thlnsa wbeNin, tor example, 
a d08 »lQves hbtselt t~ place to p1808. ~ 1s the pr1mal'7 
meaning ot "se1t-move:r.- one part or a materlal thing move. an-
oth.~ part ot itaelf. 
Seoondl7, tbeN 18 tha1i aotlv1t7, or opel"8.tlon, whioh hal no 
tu.l:-ther end than tru. operation 1 t.elt .15 !'hue, to ••• 18 an 
operation and an end. in It.eU. !hi. t7P8 ot activlty - opera-
tion, and e.pec1all,. tbat opentlon wMoh 1. an. end 1n it.eU -
113 the true indica tl an of l1re. 
OPBRA.!IOIl AND llA'fURB. ~ th1nge aN sald to d1tt.it e •• en-
t1al17 11" one or the. baa a aet of operat1ona 1fh1oh the other 
does not have.16 fhi8 pl'1nclple 18 founded upon a ve1'1 baa!e 
I t 
lSst • fhomas, l)l DC .. ta._", le'oih a, f18es: QUia ena dix.rat 
quod. opue .at t1n1a. po ••• 1 ulqu1a oNdere, quod hoo e .• set vel'UJll 
in orm1bua. Sed ipse hoo NlIlOvet, d.1eena. quod qu.al:"UlD1am. aot1v-
aruza potentlal"tUll ult1mwJ t*1n18 .at solus Qua potentIa., et non 
allquld opel'atum pe~ aotionem. potentlae J sleut ult1mul .tint. po-
tenti .. viaiva. est Vi.lo, at praeter •• non tit a potentIa 
vislva allq.uoct opus operatum. 
1GSt• fh0Dla8. II Oont..... Gente., 6S I l'nven1nsua enim allquaa 
lnt*lmaa tONA$ quae In nuX!am. ope:ratlonem poasunt rd.8i ad quam 
Be extendunt q.ual1tatee quae sunt d1sposltlones matel-i.e, ut 
oaUdum. frlg1dum, hum1dum. slocum, mrum, deuaum, grave at leve, 
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experienoe:. our awareness ot the dIverslty among activitIes. 
Without. going through a complete explanatIon of the hylomorph1c 
composition of material thlngs, it 1s suff1cient to point out 
that accidental and substantial ohanges ahow a matt8~/form cam-
posltlon in wMch substantial tona detel'"mines ott specities the 
paP'ticular essence or natu1'tt whIch the thing possesses. This , 
substantial to~ 1. a caUSe ot the thing'. existenoe and actual-
Ity.l" But th1ngfB existing in aet aN able to exel'olse aotlcna 
only in 80 tar aa th_,. aN 1n Ht .. 19 A thing 1* not able to aot 
1n that "spact in whioh 1t 1s only 1n potency; 1t 1n potency, :1 
does not have the p.rfection) and a thlng U not able to give 
wbat 1t does not have. S1nce the 'being 1. able to aot 1n so tar 
as 1t 1s in act, 1t. aotlvlty must tollow the mode of" being and 
I f 1 l I 
at hi. atm11l.1 .lout forma. .1 ... nto~J unde lata. aunt torma. 
omnlno mater1al.es .t total! te.t- !.mmersae materIa.. Super' has In. 
v8nlunwr t01"!l:lla8 l'd.xtorua eol",Po1'UDl" quae ..... operantul!' • to .. vi".· 
tute ...... qua. consequ1tlU' .arum apeei_} slout ao.a..a trahlt 
rerrwa. Supep haa lte1"Wl inveniuntUl" aJ.iquae tormae quarwa 
operat1one8 extendunt't.ll? ad allqua operata que exeedunt virtutem 
qualltatum pra&d1ctarwa, quamna quaUtate .• praed1ctae orgaa1cae 
ad harum operatlone. d ••• l!"Vlant sieut aunt anima. plantal"Um •••• 
ct. a180, .sue',t. P1'l? ~~ ~ Si1~t. Orea.t. art. 11,0. 
l'1st• !homa., 1. !h., I-II. 179, lad 1: Ad pl"lmu:m, ergo 
dicendum q\lod pl'Oprla-roftlll. uniuscUlusque tac1ens 1psum esse in· 
aetu, e8t; priDciplum opent1on1& p:ropl"1ae .jus • 
.... lesti• ~~., Mea'. p1i'· .:1!. V.Pirk, VIII 'A,6 e I _~e. t tlUvvm ex 8ovnv.. aeu po •• un ageM ac ones sec'Un",UD'1 quuu sun 
Botu •••• 
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aotuality which 1t hae.19 !buB 1t 1s that an agent produces 
things 1n Ita own 11kene.8J and the aotlv1t!e. ot a thing, in 
genel"8.1, manl!"est the kind ot thlng 1t 1 •• 20 BEtOQuse of th1s, 
we are able to know a ~h1ng tram the aot1~tles It tn!tlates. 
!bereloH. just on the pUl"81,. experiential level .... are able to 
show an essentIal d1fterence between two things when we are able 
to indicat. two l~uelbl. set. of activitie.. The evident con-
clWJlon .tJ:'Ola theaa cons1derations 18 that a living thing di:tteJIB 
hODl a non.l1ving th1ng ,Pl"Nuely because 1t has a set ot activi-
tl •• (ll'l111-n8nt aotlona) 1th1ch are not :t0Wld 1n fA non-llving thing 
What the •• aotlvltl •• are and what tn.,. mean 11'111 be eD.l1t.1.ned 
later. 
Ravingooncluded. however. to dltte"nt m,.,. of beinS 001'-* 
reapond1ng to dUte,.nt .eta of actt vi ti... there yet veaalna to 
decide 1n 1I'ba' thi. dttteNnce ot "types" conaists. fo a philo. 
, 
ph.r who holda that all things aN 0041.. and what 1. not a bod,. 
18 nothing, the .cure. 01* theae l:aaanent activitl ••• It "al, 
:Jl1lUIt alao be a bod,.. On the oontftl'7. h.eve", st. !!l0lQU points 
out that it 18 not be_use thia b0d.7 1a a bod,. that it 18 living, 
.. 
19St• !'bOlla.,S. 1'h., 1, 76, 1 (q nlud enba quo primo 1l11-
quid op.ra~t eat-tol"lU. ei\UI cui operatio attr1bultul'-. ••• lit 
hu1ua ... t10 .att qula nihil aglt rd.al .eoundum quod •• t aotoJ 
unCl. quo aliquid 8at aotu" eo agit. 
Oosn1~~:·~=-~o!Ip:;::r ra'W~t~ l~:!l:U;:-s!!!:it:.~e;:a 
modo en1m. opel'fltlonia et apeel. _tUtura at qual!t •• virtut!. 
pensatuJ-. Vlrtws va.o natul"&m rei m.on.atl'at. 
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rathe~, 1t 1s because It 1. 4 certain type ot body -- or &lse, 
all bodies, as such, would be 11v1ng.21 !h1a 1s a basic expel'1-
enc. and 1ntult10ll, and po1nta to a d1venaitz at principles to 
explain dltt'e7GXlC.s ot k1nd. !hat 18, me. tter ot :1 tselt 18 inde. 
terminate J to expla1n the d1vel"s1ty of material things _. the 
Na1 essent1al div.Nity -- it 1e ne-oea8ar.r to reoognize a prin-
ciple whereby matter 1. actually a ceJltaln k1nd of material thinS 
!1'hat by wh1ch a matenal thing i. ac'bua1ly a determinate type at 
being, 18 ita act, 01' its torm.sa fhus, in a livins thing_ a 
tol'!ll8l., actual element 1B needed. to exPlain Ita eBsential dIffer-
ence trom a non-living th1ng: thia 18 the soul, a non-corpa:.al 
prinolple of beingwhlob. i. the act at .. living body and thua the 
tt:re' pro1nclple ot 11t •• S3 
U1 
21st. fhomas, 8. !b., 1, 7611 C: Q.uamv18 aute. al1quod eor-pull poe.lt e ••• qu'Od4ll prlncip UtI. '91.tae, sleut cor est },):rincipi 
vItae in animal!, tamen allquod. oorpus non poteat ea •• pp1nlum 
pnnclplum Vitae. ..nit •• tum .8t en1a quode.uH' princlplum vitae 
vel viven8, non o<.Yftvenlt oorpol"l ex hoo quod eat corpus; alloqu1n 
cmme OOJ'P'WI easet "lvena aut pr1nclpl_ vit.... Conv.nit 191tu.r 
a110u1 co~pori quod 81t vi_ne, "e1 .tlam prinoipium vItae, P*J·r 
hoc quod eet tale cOl'PW'. QUod. aut. .. est acw tal., habet hoe ab 
al1quo principl0, quod 410Itur aotull -Jus. An1ma 191tur, quae .a 
prim'ta prlnolplua '1It.e, non .at carpue, .ed corporis actus. 
21st • Thoma., In VII JIt.D_, leo1;. S, IlBVB: 'Ohde patet, quod. 
.:f'·Ol"Jla •• t pPioz- quam mate'Ri"; et e1;lam eat magis .nIl quam lpaa, . 
quia pPOptel' quod Ullumquodque .t 111ud mag18. Ma t.ria eute. non 
tit ens aottl nisl pel' tormam. trnd.e opon8t quod t02'm& sit magi. 
ens quam mat.~la. 
23A.zt1stotle ,De ~f 4lSa27-412bSI Hence soul 18 the first 
aotuality o£ a naliil'ilOdy having 1n it the capacity ot I1te •••• 
the soul w:111 be the first aotual! ty of a natural body furnished 
,,1 th organa.. (All tremsle. tlonlJ ot R!. An1maare J" A. 8mi th '. , 
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All that we have dotemined so tar i. that the typltp.ng 
principle ot body cannot itself be body. !hiB 18 the inslght 
afforded by the judsaaent of separation: "It 18 evIdent that to 
be a prIncIple ot 11te, Ol' ltv1ng, doeB !!2! belong to a bod,. Pl'e-
cl •• 1,. as body, otherwise 8"$:.ry body would be living or a princi-
ple ot 11.teJ theretoN, It belongs to some body which 141 living, 
or even whIch 1. a prlnclple of llte, tor thSa rea.on that 1. t is 
a detln1te tn>e ot body.pt. theretore. the reality ot a non-
oorporeal element 18 arTdved at bJ recognizIng the ~nablli~l ot 
corporeal element. to eJC;plam all the obs.nations. 
In ocmoludlng that the souro. of vital. aottrit1 •• must be 
other t.han materIal, we leave open the poaalbUlty that there 
existB some 11te that i8 completely independent ot matter. Al-
though the judgment of 8epal"&tlon sh01l8 that the aOUJ-ee of lite 
ls non-corpoNal, 1t does not posit the existenoe of an inmaterla 
I . .. 
living beins_ And yet, trom our analysis ot a material lIving 
belng, concluding, as We do. that the soul muat be non-corporeal, 
we have metaph;yalcal oertainty that 111"8 ls not closed to spirit-
ual be1.nga, if there 8.relm,._ FUrth.";t acme or the same evidence 
1fh1ch led WI to make th.!. JudSment of •• paratlon, al.so 1~1s us 
to decide whether there a.ctually ls Iml" lite whioh 1s Intrinsical 
-
1'1 independent ot matter. 'Por, 8mce the actlvlties ot a thing 
now from it. nature. we a" able to know that nature troa an 
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analysis 0:1: the activities. A:nd sinee, as we have al:ready pOinte 
out, a differenoe of activities indicate. a ditference or nat~s 
it W~ di8eove~ any set ot activities which Is intrinsically inde-
pendent ot matter, we would have to posit a nature, a type o£ 
living, itself .1ntl"1nsleall'1 independent ot matter.SS It 1s with 
these principles 1n m1nd that in the third chapter we will take. 
up en examinatlonand an.o.lysis of the various activities which 
are manifested by living things. 
SOUL AS PlmfCIPLB OF LIn. All aotlv1t1 •• of any being 
whatsoever proceed, ... f1"Ol1 the1. ultimate 40\11'108 J f:raa that 
.horeb,. tbl. be1q 1. made actual. !h18 p1"1nc1ple of aotual1 t,. 
1s oalled fltona," In 11"f1ng beings, 1t 1. oalled fl aou1,,· !he 
eoul 1. the ultimate p~olpl. ot activity at anz living th1ng: 
it meal'll simpl7 that the substantial torm of that tb1ng "pres en 
tbe aotual1aatlon or a potentiall,. living belng.26 !b1s'1mpl1ea 
twoth1nga: 
1. Soul 18 the pJ'1noiple oE lUG only in thoa. be1nge which 
are compoaed of _tal' an4 tom, an,. aubsiatent fORa would. 1 teel.t 
be an ultimate principle of vItal aotlv1'! ••• 
2. !be acu.1 1s the ~l:t1Jlat~ pr1nelple otv1 tal aottv! tl •• J 
1 j 
SSst. fh~., II CantJi'a ".t 68: 'O'nUmquodque en1a operat 
aecund'um quod est; una. row eu]ua operatio exced.1t condltlonem 
mat.~lae. et Ipsa, seoundum dIgn1tatem au! eaae, auperexcedlt 
mater1am.. 
2Gsee Note 24. 
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a compoa1t. being ot necesslty needs oertain Rrox1mate principles 
thl'ough which the soul acts. These proximate principles ot aetlv 
Ity may be elthel' material or immaterial: matel)tlal, as the organ 
ot the eye) immaterial as the power of sight itself -- aa we shal 
see. 
The tact that the soul 1s the form ot the body p:reoludes any 
;; 
qUestion .a to a dualiam. a8 Ragusaa puts its 
!be soul 1s not me:rely operat1ona11y present in the 
body as In Plato where it pl .. ,.. the role or mover to 
mO"!!<i f but 1 t .18 existentIally pre.ent as put or the 
ol"'pru.smts aetual constitution. It reduce. the baN 
potential1t7 of' the _terial bod.,. into a posItive 
aetuaUtl_ !b'wI 1t 1. usele •• to que.t1on whether 
the soul and body are one, since together they torm 
a complete .uba~tlal un1Oft.87 
Consequently. we .. , <terlne a little moN 018&1'1.,. what 18 JI'.leant 
by ·aelf-acwer.1t In 0Jl$ senSe it; i. not true that; the soul moves 
the bod." 
81110e it 1a the bod,.'s torm, and not properly d18t1t1ct 
(a11ud quid) t1'Oll 1t. It Is, we repeat, a constituent, 
not a move~.ae 
on the other hand .... actual principle, the soul does move the 
body 1n the .ense of beine the ultimat. IIOUM" of all the activI-
tle. that are attributed to an animate body_ Ae "glver or EUllse," 
the .cul, then, 18 the baais foX' the llv1ng body-i. existence !! 
27,_ J. Ra.SU8aa. !he SUbstance The0it at Kind !!!! O.onte!!EOX'-
.!£l Ft.mCtl,ona1~sm. ~~.,'S'I. p:-r3. 
P. l:~~· D. Sertl11anges. !at ;Fpundatlon~ 2t. T!lom1.t~~ f h11o,s,o;2hl 
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}.lv1nS and as able to perform vital activities. As Aristotle 
says: 
rhe 80ul 1. the cauae Ol" sauroe or the 11Ylng body .. 
The tarmIJ cause and source have many senses. But the 
80ul 1. the calle. of It. body alike 1n all three sen-
ses which we expllcl tly recognize. It 1. (a) the 
sourca or o"iS1n of movement, it 1s (b) the end, it 1s 
(0) the eseene. or the whole livIng body. 
!hat it 18 the last. 1s clear, tor, 1n eve~h1ng 
tl'l.$ .Ju.ence 1s identical wlth the pound o£ its being, 
and here, in tbe case ot 11 vtng th1.nga 1 their being 1s 
to live, and, of their beIng and their l.1 v1ng the III oul 
in them 18 the caUBe or souree.S9 
Ar1atotle, ot course, 18 taking ftesaenee" 1n 1t. strict senee 01' 
that which const! tutea a being 1n 1 ta specie.s. ~. specific torm 
ot a living thing, ita soul, Is such a pl'1r&elple. 
It 18 to be noticed that "soul" Is introduced only to be 
len, relatively, in the baokg~. Aa we pointed out. Itaoul" 
is proper only to beings compoaed of matter and torm.. !heretore. 
soul does not belong to lite d .uoh. but only to thoae liaterial 
11 ving th1ngJs" 1'0 lIu17 that soul belonga to lite as such is to 
PM-judge the poea1b111t,. of a soul-le •• 111'. of an illlU.tel'1al 
be1n.g. A8 a matter 01' taet, we wUl. 1nvestlgate soul ... life be-
cause our experI.noe ls ooncemed w1th that J but baving deter-
mined wbat it _ana to 11ve 111 material beinp, because we have 
al:Nilady - •• papated" lIfe tl'ODl matter, OUl' conclusions w111 entbl'ao 
soul-less lite as well. 
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To conolude: 
1. 1'he points brought out in this ohapter are not new or 
dlffioult to und,&xaatand by one vereed 1n St .. ThomAS t philosoph,.. 
2. I have tried, however. to stress the exiatentiaJ. and 
experient1al basis ot the prinoiples we find 1n our first analy-
S18 at living thtnga. 
3. All thea. pl"1nolples are neoessary r_ understanding the 
next pa~ of the the.is J tb~,. wl11 be applied in ou:r atte~'t to 
undepatand the natuM or a living th1ng. 
OHAP1'ER III 
!be Intul t1on: file Grades of Life 
.......... ........... .r't .................... 
But since the mode. of lite are mul tipl., if only ane 
or them 1. in a thing, tbat th1ng is said. to be lIving 
and an1.mawd. Ute, he lAx-iatotlj] says, shows 1tselt 
in ton,. mode. * (1) a8 InteUeotual) (2) aa sensitIve) (5) a8 the cause of motion or reat in space} (il) as the 
eau.. of tbe mo1;iOll8 of tak1ng ttotLrisbment. dec.,. and 
growth. Be d1et1ngu1shea anl7 the.. tour modea, al-
though he baa alNaci7 dlst1ngu1ehed t1 ve :main typel of 
vItal. actIvity. and this beoaU8e he 18 thinking here 
and now ot the· degree of a.n.1mate be1n~h... The ap· 
petitive power, wb1ch makes a titth t1P8 of vitality, 
does not, howe.,.r, ~l,. a die tine t grade 01' 11 ving 
be1n8. tor 1t &lft.,.. acoompanies sensation.1 
MAtERIAL LIVING mINOS. In the preVious ehapkr we d1s-
covered that ImmaneD" actIvity, 01' opel'Qtlon, 1s the sign or life 
In this ehapter ... e 1dJ.1 anal,... d1.tferent kinds of operatlC11fw1 t 
the purpo •• or dete1'lldn1ns the preo1 •• natlU'$ ot the be1ng that 1 
• 
lat. f,fhCIIIIU. la II de ~t leo1;. 8, #2M-2551 Sed cum 
multIplex sit modus vival. aI unus tantum eowm insit alieu1, 
d1cl'tUl" 111u4 vlvlIl'lS et anl:matutJh Ponl' auhm quatuor modoe 
vivendi. quorum unua tUft pel'" intellect_, .eoundua per •• nsum, 
tertlwa pet- motum et atat;w.a local •• , quanua per motum al1ment1, 
et deore_nt1 .t augmenti. Ideo aU1;_ quatuor tantum modo. POlll t 
Vivendi, oum supra quinque genera operation:um an1mae posuer1t, Quia hie intend1t dIet1.nguere modos vivendI, seoundum gradua 
vlventlum. qui 41at1ngueNntlut .ooundum haec quatuor ••• ., Appetl-
t1vum. autem, quod est quintua praeter baM qu.e.tuor, non tacit 
al1quam diveditat_ 1n grad1bu8 vivent1_. liam ub1cum.que est 
.ensus! ihi •• t et "ppet1tua. Of. alao In 148 Sensu at Senaato. 
1eot. :1 13• (the banalatlon and numbei=rng 'i,ie' :freD. r. 'oaiirp 
AJ:1.atp,.J.e' • .D.! An!!!!' the Latin text is troa the Puma edition.) 
4:3 
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able to act 1n that _,.. One of the tint things w. notioe about 
living things 1s the d1fterenoe ot vital activIties to be found 
among them. In understanding this difference in aotivity, there 
are two poe.fbl. poaltl.on.a: either the d1fterenoes are simply 
different and il'r.duolble, ,aneto another, or they are so reduci-
ble. We saw on the V&r'1 til'St page ot this tbesis. that there 
are numerous attempts not only to reduce all vital activities to 
one, but to reduce both living and non-living to a connon denomi-
nator. This. o:t course. is the first hope 01 the physical acl-
entist: to explain allot the physical world 1n terms ot tbe 
least numl.>er of concepts. We have seen to What extent this 1s 
possible. As long Q only the material p:roeesses are considered, 
there are great likenesses to be found among material living 
th1nge in some of the1%' opex-ations. As t~ as the "aotivities" 
ot eleot:rona are oonoem.ed, there ls even likeness between theae 
• 
non-living elements and liVing th1nga. But how ta%' tbis analysis 
i8 still1n contact wtth reality 18 questionable. Suoh an analy-
ais 1" concerned with bodies _. no' as a ifiml!! ot material things 
but only as a ~at; ot a whole, e.8 st. !homas distinguishes in R!. 
Ente etE8sent1a.! 
I' I ....... _.1 r 4· 
•• n 
Sst. '!bemas, De Enta, Ch III, 11. Poteat e:rgo hoc nam.en eo 
pue rem quamdam <1eitgn.a.i::e. quae habet talem tOmant, ex qua sequi-
tur in ipse. 'V' ·sign.abl11tas tl"'1um d1mens1onum CtmlJ:N.$C181ane (Italics mine , ut scilioet ex 111a forma null,'ii"': 'er!ue perfect! 
sequatur, .& s1 a11quid a11ud superadd1tur, sit pMeter aign1f1-
catianem corporiS, sio dietl, at hoc modo corpus 8rit ~ter1al~s 
et integral!. pal'S anbJalla: quia s10 anima _rib Meter tel uod 
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A ph!lo8oph1cal anal.,.1. 1& concemed with the Whole in. 
dividual, including the soul which make. tbe bod,. this 11vi:Y 
bod,.. Such an anal,..1. agre.. with St. ifhou.. when he says I 
POl' 1t 1s not of th1a alone that a thlng bas !nona •• 
and deoNa •• that 1t 11:v •• , but a thinS 18 sald to 11ve 
alao because 1t •• na.. and und.~tand8 and 18 able to 
pet-tom othe:r worics proper to 11t •• ;5 
Per to .ense and to un4eHtand aX'$ i_nent aotivlties, and to'J.* 
th1a Naaon aN the,. vital act1vit1 ••• 
ID what _,., thel"efore, aN vegetation, sensation, local 
mov .. nt, 1ntellectlon and appetition -i_nent activities", In 
what _,. do the,. give 'WI a metaphysical unde .. tand1ng of lit., 
1. V-etat1pp.. the aotlv1t1 •• pJWOPe" to vegetative 11.te 
&1'8 growth. nutri tlcm. and MProduct1on." B1 g~owth 1. meant the 
asaWlatlOl'l at mat ... tor purpoe.. 01' development and 1no:reue 
in a1.. • !bid 18 not .. process of _" add! tlon, l1ke brick upon 
'Wiok, "thaI' the .... Wlated tood 1. conaiumeted !Z the "11v1ng 
thinS 1t.elf into new pans .!!! the 11 virla thing It •• lf 40; !he 
1st. !h0Jld f l)1 II !e...... leot. 1, 1819: I'on en1a ex hoe 
aolo quod al,1qu1Cl &bet . . et a .. "....ntula 'V1ftt, •• d .tl_ 
ex hoe quod •• 11tlt et tnt. 1111t. at all. ope .. vitae exel'Ce:re 
poteat. 
4An• totl •• U. ~,'lSbll.14: There 18. however, .. dlt'-
tereM8 between nU'lr1.1IiI'tr and o0.n4uolvltJ to growth. In 80 fu 
as the azli-.t;e th.S.ng 1f quan:tlltaUve. what 18 taken promote. 
g:a-owthJ 1D 80 r.,.. .. 1t 1. a 4efWM 1ndlvldual, What 18 taken 
nouriahea. Por the a»1mat. tbSns p"88ne8 ita substance O~ 8e-
.ent!al natUl'e and. es1ata as lons .a 1t 18 nour1ahCMh an4 it 
cause. tho production, not of what 18 nounshed, but ot another 
individual like l1h Ita e.sential nature al:t9adyenata, and 
noth1ng generate. 1t88lJ', 1t only ma1nta1na 1t. eXiatence. 
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ma.terial accumulation itself is called "growthtt; tho fact that by 
this assimilation the individual substance is preserved, is 
called "nutrition." "Metabolismn is the general word which in-
cludes the processes of catabolism and anabolism: the loss and 
restoration of energy and matter ~ ~ pu£Pose of maintaining 
the existence of the vegetable. Thirdly, living things reproduce 
themael ves. 5 When the plant (or animal) has reached a certain 
state of maturity, it brings new and distinct living individuals 
into being. A part of the living thing is separated fror.l the 
parent(s) and becomes a new individual.6 That this may be ac-
complished, however, the generative activities are first of all 
directed to the perfection of the parents that they may be able 
-
to reproduce their kind. 
It is evident that physico-chemical processes are present in 
Ssee George P. Xlubertanz, S.J., The P!lilosol'hX.2! Human 
Nature, pp. 39-41 and all of Chapter I!'r.' 
Gpor Ar:tstotle, this phenomenon was a clear indication of 
the (more or less futile) striVing of corruptible things to share 
in the divine. Ufe -- all kinds of li:£,o -- in some way partici-
pated divine activity. The continuation of the Stecies was the 
closest corruptible things could come to divine e amIty. De 
Anima, 4158.23-68: It .follows that first of' all we must tre'it of' 
nutrItion and reproduction, for the nutritive soul is found along 
with all the others and is the most primitive and widely distri-
buted power ot: soul, being indeed that one in virtue of' which all 
are said to have life. The acts in Which it manif'ests itself' are 
reproduction and the use of' food -- reproduction, I say, for any 
living thing that has reached its normal development and whioh is 
not mutilated and whose mode ot generation is not spontaneous, 
the most natural act is the production of another like itself, an 
animal producing an anima,l, a plant a plant, in order that, as 
far as its nature allows, it may partake in the eternal and di-
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Em,. vegetative activity. But as Father Fablf'o points out,7 It i8 
not the presenef) at the.. forces that oharaetel'lz8a 1118. but the 
peeuUar way In Which 'heo~gar.dsm U8e8 these torces in the vital 
F 
activity. !hIs 18 the tOJ'Ce of ouz- jUdgment ·or sepaMtlon: to 
dll1tlqu1sh the M •• ' of vital flOt:tvlt,. ~ the cnmdltions and 
_m... !h1a 1a alao the force 0'1 Arutotle" d1at1nc tim or 
thfte (H,..ponenu in the nutl"1tlve aot1v1t,.: "that whioh 18 ne>u.r-
~.h.d (tb. enaoul&d bodiJ. that with 'Whloh it 18 nourished. [nu-
tn.n~. and that Wh10h ~.he. It (!he aouJ.].·8 
I.~tl... !he f.t:lOm1.tlO paMlpl. or tontal obje.t 
I I 
vine. fhat u tbe seal t~ whioh aU tb.1nsa at!'! Vet, that tCU' 
the ... 0'1 which tm.l do whate.Yep the1Jt nature NndeN posei-
ble.. b phra...tOI- tbe .alee ot. _:loh J 1s aablgueua J ! t ma,. 
__ 81iher fa) the .. to aohi_va wbtolle. (b) tbe being in 
Whoa. interest. the a.' 1. done. Smoe Ih.n no living 'hinS U 
able to partake 1n What 18 .temal and d1v1ne by unlnteJ'I'Upted 
cmt.ln1.taJwe (:to. notll1ns pel'1ahable can tOll8ver remain OM and 
tNt ... ). 1.. '.le. to achieve that end 1D the on!,. -7 PO_Sible 
to It, and aweesa 18 poaalble tn -vying d..SMe. J 80 It "_!lui 
not 1nd .. d as the •• U __ .. mcU,v14ual but oont1nu: •• Ita ea1atenc 
1n aomethlng ,l1k~ 1 ta.U .... not numerlcall,. but 8P8d11t:1call,. one \OJ 
"'0. Fabre., ttlln Sagg10 de tl1oaotia ~lla blolog1a" Bolletino 
ftloaotl,OO, vOJ.,3, p. VOl £'A. !ntattl eom1nc1a oon 11 x-!oonos-
ceN om; 'lli ognl Ulllteatu10ne vitale de ordine lnterioN (vese-
taUTo) v •• d1 fatto pruente un upetto t1.1c~hem1oo, polohi 
11 vlvente non rlsulta d1 &It!'1 element! ., n~ 81 pub eostru1re • 
oanae1"'f8.ft per altre torae •••• , La pecul1aJ'11Ji1 deUa vIta. •• " non 
va .eNata neUe. pre.anaa d,t energ1. (ed ettett) d,'oJ'd1ne •• tN-
fisico, _ 21.e1 aodo <ltveno cU. O~" ohe 1. _4e81M .t~. pre-
sentano nei due' iiiOUd.t mo~g.nroo itt organleo. 
rlfaJ 11 princlp10 1'1 tale • qu1nd.1 benal .peo1f1eo .auperl0 
all. rorH della t1s1co-ch:1mloa polehe Ie "gola e 1e domina, .. 
ina1.- ha la sua att!v1t. lepta alla Dl8d •• 1me cemme a .sal 
neeEt •• ari ..... 
SArl.,otle, R.! ,Aptma, 4l.e'beo-sa. 
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anal,..1. 8learly shows that .ensation 18 a dlfterent k~ ot 
Bct!Yit" than thoae considered under -vegetation." !'he object of 
the activity 18 the pea.esslon by the one •• nalng of the material 
torm of the one sensed .. 1flthout, how.Ter, aotuall,. tak1ng up and 
asalnd.latlng the lat'ter'. physieal being. fh,1. 1s to poese •• an-
other "l ... t.rielly,a and 1t 1. really the de£1n1tlon or knowl-
edge. tith repld to 8enaatlon,. cona14es- th1II text tz-om. Ax-ta-
tot.l.,9 
P01' that whloh po:.oelves 1G'Q8t be an extended magnitude. 
Senal t1 v1t1, however. 1s not an extended aagn1 tude, nor 
le tbe sense. they are rather a certain oharaoter or 
power o~ the Ol'pn. Front thl. 1. t 18 evIdent 1'lh7 excesses 
in the •• nalhl. objects de.troy the •• nse-o~.... It 
1s evident, again, why planta bave no .ensation. althoue;h 
they have one pan o~ soul and are obvlou.ly afreoted by 
tangible ob Jee., f01' thei%' tempel'atuH can be nl •• d and 
lowelNtd. l'he l'e&aon 1s that the,. have 1n them no mean. 
no pnnc1ple oapable ot "cel vlng the tOl"lU ot aena1ble 
objeota rithout 'helr mattep, but on thecontw1'7. when 
the.,. are acted upon, the mat ... :r acta upon them. aa well. 
a) ~"18 a 41at1nct1on made between the one who ".nsel 
(a material b.1ng) and tb$ s.n •• power tu:>pther w1th the act of 
aensation l.elf (1mmaterial 1n 1ta mode at opel'8.tlon, slnee Its 
act 1e pJleol •• 17 to pos •••• the tOB f4 another without loa8 of 
1ta 0Wl'l natUNl. rON). !he e.ue-p01f8:r, however, ~c~ the 
organ, u St. fb<su point. out,10 and ahaNe being with 1t. 
tid. 
iAn.totl., it. ~, 4S4Bse-bs. 
lOst. t'h01ll&8, ,~ n n. Am.M. leot. 24. ,666: :It 4101t quod 
pJ.'f1mma .enaltlVUl1.,-rdeat' Pl'1iiiiii"'"Ol'gantmt. aensus eat 1n. quo eat po-
tentia hujuamodl, quae 80111cet eat 8U8oeptl va apeele1U1:D alne ma-
teria. Organum enim sensua, cum potentia Ipsa, utputa oculu8. 
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!h18 la wb:1 e.... in the .enatble ob 3eot which de.tro,. the 
organ, a.l.ao tmpai1"8 thI operation of the •• na. power. 
b) Senaation d1t.tera trom ..... tation in tbat tw. one •• n-
sing Noelv" the tom of the sensible object without tak1nS up 
1_ phyeical exts'enoe, 1Ih11e the plant rece1ves the tOl'lll and 
matt." both. !he "aaon tot! thls i. that the sense p_~ 18 not 
an,. of ita objeo" (oontJnWiea) and so 18 abl. to Neelft the •• 
the plant 18 not .uGh .a _en, :1 1; 1. ent!rel,. mateltial both in be-
ing and opel"fLtion. I1m1ted to the pO.U' •• 81011 at ita own tom. 
i!le .ena1ent beins ,. _'-rial 1n Ita e::ld.atenee, but immaterial 
in ita opefttion, In that 1t 18 able to poa •••• tOJtl'l8 other than 
ita own. 
0) :til either _; •• ~ act1v1t1 •• aN immanent .... t:b$7 pro-
o •• d t,.. ~ one ... tins (plant 01" an1mal) and the., pert .. , the 
I f 
one aoting. For tb1a peaBon are th.,. vital act1vlt1 ••• 
3) !22!1iltlon. !bU 18 pe,rbapa the plaM to lnvoduee ap .... 
pet! tlon, as.no. t 
all an1mal •• haft at le.a' one Sens8, tou.h, and. wheN 
••• atlOll 1s tound, ~re 1s pleuure and pain. and that 
.hiob. cause. pleU1.lft and pain, and. Where tbe.. aN, 
theN aleo 18 d •• 1re, dealre bems appetite 1'011 wha'C 1. 
t I 
eat idem aubj .. to, .ed .a.e a11ud est. quia ratione dltte" po-
tentia a corpon_ lotentia en:t.m. .at quasi lorma o%tgan1. ut aupra 
tl'Adltum est. Bt 14eo subdlt quod 'magnitudo," id.at 01lganum 
eorporeUII. •• t, 'quod •• UUlSl patltuJr.' ldeat quod .at 8u8ceptlV1.UZl 
sensua, 810u' _t:eria t'omae. )Ton 1iamen eat eadem Rtl0 magnt .... 




Appetite tollows upon knowledge; the good being presented, its 
perfection known (either sensually or intellectually), it becomes 
a posolble object or desire. Again, desire (or aversion) is an 
activity ot a living being which is initiated within it tor its 
own. perfection. 
4. tntelli§ence. The intellect is a power distinct fram 
any we have so ta%'* conSidered, \'fith its own activity and its own 
prope%'* object. Its distinctive activity is manifested in a true 
language; its proper object is being. It is a form ot knowledge 
whose activity is supra-material and supra-temporal (while sensa-
tion is both material and temporal) and whose object is grasped 
without even the conditions of matter. The evidence of the 
supra-temporality of language is expressed by Father Klubertanz 
in this way:12 
Fo%'* example Ie to make e. s ta tement, and to arrange the 
words properly to form a sentence, it is necessary to 
have the whole meaning of the sentence in mind through-
out each of its parts. Therefore, the act which gener-
ates language is a unifying, synthesizing aot, which 
exists as a whole throughout an entire series of materi-
al activities.... The aot which dominates the success-
ive must itself be without succession. The kind of 1.U1ity 
that the sentenoe (or other complete expression of thOU&lt) 
has as a meaningful sign involves a unifying act which is 
extended neither in space nor in time. But that which Is 
not extended in space or time is in no sense material. 
12 G. P. Klubertanz, S. J ., ~ Phllos ophl E! Human Nature _ p. 
161. 
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Beoauae, theNtOR" the act of under.tancU.ns 18 in thla -7 w.ep_ 
-
an tedft trail (1.e., independent of) matter.. the power which px-o .... 
due.. that act u _11 as the nature .tJPam wbleh that power pro-
oeeds muat be lI.epaJ'&ted.tI 1"1"<.'m mattel-.lI That 18 to eay, the in-
telle'ctl .... 80\11 1a lntl"1ns1caU., 1ndepcmdent of matter both 1n 
It. oPC!t,..t:1on and 1n it. cud.atenee. !hi. latter tact 18 called 
... p171tua.llt7·... there are other l1ncta ot ev1dence (tlUoh u the 
unl veHall t,. of1ntellectual knowledge) whioh lead to the ... 
oonolus1on an4 are tn"...tlpted el ••• hare. !'he pnnc1pal concem 
ot th1a thea 1. 18 $be b»plloat10l'lB eontained in the taot that 
heN 1s .. v1 tal (1~t;) act! vit,. that 18 lntr1naloal1,. mde-
pend_t of mat... A «.tuition o'E "11v1ns th1ng'l •• -that 1tb1oh 
IlJ7.tltheal.- matenala into 1ts CRIll 8ubatanoe" does not 1D.oluQ 
tho 1U. ot tnte11M'. A 4et1n1tlon 111 hlW or 1mraa~t utiv. 
it,. does 1nclude t:he lite of !.ntenect. 
5. ltooomotlon. Qu1te 8impl,-. locomotion 18 caused by both 
knowledp and ap~teDO" 'ogether with a paR of the bodyae the 
1natra:unent --l'8bJ' the 1fhole ~1ng 18 :moved .oward the desired 
ob3eot. Consider b1."toUe QQ this poln1a14 
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How motion 1JnpUes thJ!ee th1ng$, tint that which cause. 
motion, secondly tha:t "Nb,. it oawse. motion, and aga1n. 
th1rdly,. tbat which 1s moved; and or theae,. that wb1ch 
oausea motion 18 two-told, t1Nt17. that which 18 1 taelf 
unmoved and, secondl.,. that .Moh both oauaee motion and 
1. It8~lt moved. !be unmoved movent 1s tbe practical 
good. [!.$ kn()WllltS]. that which 1. moved and causes motion 
1. the appetetlve hoult7 (tw the animal wh1ch 18 moved 
18 moved in so ta~aa 1t de.lr::!! and. desire 18 a apeoie. 
ot mot1onor activit,.) and.:1 17. the t:b.1n8 moved 18 
the WJ.1mal. BUt the instrument nth which deslM move& 
1t, OllOe reached, 18 a part of the bod}'# hence 1t mwlt 
be dealt with un.del" the tunctlc:m.s OOl'lmton to body end sOUl. 
A.l.l the activitleawe haV-Et considered, th&n.ar& immanent 
aotlv1ties. actlvitie. indicating a living being. we have seen 
tbat these aetlvltle., While all EU'8 !,~t, atill dlfte~ a.mang 
eaoh otbep and JlItildlea11,. 80. We have ••• that knowledge 1a a 
dl.t1"erent te or activity than nutntlooJ and tu.Pther, under-
standing 1$ a dUt.re.nt 'b'D! ot activity than sensation.. (Appe'" 
tit10n and locomotion ,are subsumed under sensltive and intellee-
t1ve lit •• ,) Becaus. or an 1l'Nduo1ble dUf'eren .. an tb.. level of 
• 
aottvl'", ft 1N1'fit led to posIt an ••• enUal dUh!'ellCe on the 
level at c1aknoe ale 
1) the non-liv1n8 is essentiall,. difterent than the living, 
d j 
16An8totle, P.I. . . 481&13: Both b... then, are tho. 
eaWife. o~ loccaot'Iin,. PJ,'lCe and appewne.,.... end 4SjA9 = 
F .. aetl. otteJl,J!.ct contft:l"7 to ,knowl .. e4ge 1n ,obediellOe \0 their 
imaginings, lJ.t: ... l'egud ~g1nat1on as one spec!es of think-
in(] t wh11e 1n the othel'" an1mals theHis no prooc..,.& of th1nldng 
or reuon1nS, but eole1,. imag!ne.t1011., 
l~ee abaPte%' rtro of th1. tbeals .. 
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2) the sentiont is essentia.lly different than tho vegetn-
tive; 
:3) the intellective is essentially diff'erent tha.."'1 the sen-
tient. 
And the last type includes an immateria.l existence which is 
called "spiritual.1f 
THE GRADES OF MATERIAL LIFE. In the proceeding section, we 
considered living things in two ways: in the first way, we dis-
tinguished five types of' immanent activity; in the second wa.y we 
reduced these five to three grades of life. The ratio of the 
distinction is founded upon whether the object or the subject of' 
the activity is considered. l ? The formal object analysis dis-
closed five types of' activities; but if we distinguish the mode 
l7st • Thomas, ~est. Disp. de Veritate, X, 1 ad 2: 'Ad se-
cundum d1cendum. qu genera potentlax-um animae distinguunt~ 
dupllclter: uno modo ex parte object!; all0 modo ex pa.rte sub-jectl, slve ex parte mod! agendl, quod in idem redit. 81 19itur 
dlstlnguantur ex parte object!, sic lnvenluntur quinque potent!-
arum genera supra en'l..lll1.erata. 8i autem distinguantur ex parte 
subjectl vel modi ngendi, slc sunt trIa genera potentiarum anI-
mae; scilicet vegatativum, sansitivum, at intelleotivum. Opera-
tio enim anunae tripllolter poteat se habere ad materIa!:.l. Uno 
modo ita quod per modum naturalls actionis exerceatur; et tali~~ 
actionum prinoipium est potentia nutritiva, cujus actus exercen-
tur qualltatlbus activis at passivis, siout at aliae actiones 
m3,teriales. Alio modo ita quod operatio animae non pertingat ad 
ipsam materiam. sed solum ad materine conditionas; stcut est in 
actibus patentine sensitiva.e: in sensu onim recipitur species 
sine lnateria, sed tamen cum mnteriae condi tlonibus. Tertio modo 
ita. quod operatio aniraae excedat at rt'lD.teriam et LlB.tal"iae condi-
tiones; at sic est pars a.nimae intellectiva. 
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ot acttns. on tho pal"t; ot the subject. there a:re three geMJ.'16 or 
vital pOW$re. the vegetative, the sentient, and the lntel1eotlve4 
The redon tOl' this distinction i8 round 1n the aoults relation 
to matter. In the fir.t twe of power, vegetative, the soul ex-
e:rcls.s its natural mode of activity (as dlat1ngtdehed hall an 
elioited or aequu.d mode) by _ana of acid." and pas.ive quall-
tles whoa. term 18 Pl'8cl •• 1y the material object as material. 
thus, the plant take. 1n matter '0 add to 1ta quantity_ Secondly 
the opeN-tlon of' the .out _y tend not to the matter :1 t •• 11' ot an 
objeot, but only to the- material oonditlona of pant.ulant.,. 
space and thte. 'Ih!a 18 the manner of O1Htntlon of the 8eD81tlve 
power which SNape the fo_ at a material ob 3eot under the con-
ditione of matter 'but without the phJ'81oal mat.1"1al existence 
wb10h that object bU in reaU.t,.. The third Nlation wM.ch a 
aoul oan have to _tt_ 18 to entirely .... d It and th. oondl-
• 
tiona ot materiality, g~ptng the .tOl'm of an objeot apart hom. 
1ta particularity, 8Pao&. and time. All .. have aeon this ls 
proper to 1ntellect1vo activit,.. o.ne _Y. theretox-e, to dut1n-
gui8h the grades of Ute 18 by the: "lat1on ot vital aotivity to. 
matte:r. 
A second -7 1s $Xpftea.d by John ot st. 'fhomaa. Sllw.e what 
1acommon to all l1v1ng thing. 1. that the,. move themselves. he 
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8&,..,18 there 1M a thNe-told distinotion at living thh'lp be .... 
c,auae there aN thNe _,. 0'1 mov1n.g one •• lf., Por, the prULclple 
ot llOtlon aN agent and end, and with l'8l1pecf; to dl1'ectlon and 
orientatIon or tM motlcm. agent tdth "spect to the execution of 
the motion (and alao the tom whtch 1. the proximate p~olple at 
motIon as eld.at1ng 1n the agent and "pre8entat1". ot the end). 
SCIlI8 living tb.S.r.\p move tbem8elvea ml7 with 88peot to the 
~outlC1l ot the mot1 •• 8ince 1'oa fUld end are oompletely'.Mr-
m1ne4 t~ Vl_ bJ thai!' nature. 'lb.1. 1s the vegetabl. lUe.19 
othel' Uv1ng tIlSasa move tb .. elv •• both with respect to the 
execution of mot1. ed w1th Mapeo' to aoqUlring fonna (in know-
4. I .1' lS,. of 8t. IhCIIU.(h.'treua PJdlOSC2S-' Yol. af p. aeb4C) 
and t~. t .... quod 0JIb11r1'en\! .1 omnl -. C01lI1IUll6 e.t •• lp-
aUll Blf)'ftN, at In hoe p~ di.'bs.nsuttur a non v!vente, quia non 
vtvena tan ... ovetw:- ab allo; v:1ventl auta lIO'Vet •• lP8um. Quare 
d1ve"!taa v1tae u 41""1'80 modo .e IWNn41 4$bet deaum1. Bat 
aute. t~l.x modUlI •• aovendl. ergo et tn.plex 1'1ta. Jt1ho:r pro-
batu. j quia pl'1nolplum _twa 8.t agena .t tlni. f t1rda quid_ 
quoad 4lMotlonea .t alUo.ntla. agena Aut .. quoad _.cutlonem. 
Baeutl0 auta c:lependet &b a11q'Wll t"fIIl'iIlIR taaqu.e.m a principali 
Pflnoipl0 at ab1nat3Nlltn.o tamquam a mId!o operant!. S •• also 
St. lb. ..... 1_ ~ •• I. 18, a o. . 
l~d •• AUqua .Pgo aunt, qua. IlOVent •• !pea .olum quoad ex-
Gout!· .. . .otua, nOl1 veM ad. aoqulNndum t1nem. vel t'ormam~. qu1bua 
mo.aant •• t •• d ta.ta tWa quam .fox.. operandi 8\Ult lWa a.eter-
m1n.ata .. natu:N et pusl .. Wi. dantu.1"', non 88 movent ad 111&. 
Et Me •• , int1mu.s padua v.1tu, llo111cet "ssetat1vua. Plantae 
en1m movent •• q;uoad e.uoutlonem llutrttlanIa .\ _eratlon! ... non 
taman tinem alb! Pft •• t1~t, neque tGllV.&', qu1bu8 opeftmtWl", 
aoqull"tln\. 
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ledge) 'Which can be a source ot motion. !his 1. sene. l1fe,20 1n 
which the pr1nelple8 or operation are not; aU c1etem1ned by na-
tuM, but aft -intentionallY" unit1ve ot the mover with the ob-
ject t4 lta _tion. 
And 1n thAt t;h1rd place, there are those beings that move 
themeel", •• even 1n •• tar .a tbey detel"J2d.ne the enda 01' ~:t1' ac-
tivlt7. whtob are n~ completel,. det.m1ned tOl! them bY' Datu". 
Bot onlY' the erut 18 cho.en, but proportionate _ana also. \'hue J 
tntell •• t! ve belnpmeve the.elves ODInl _odo.il j , ., ........... 
1'0 a,.. up 80M o~ the th.1np we have ••• 1'1: 
1. :tDntment &o'lV1t7 18 the sign ~ 11te. 
2, The" IlJ'II) dlttennt wa.,. in wh1ch activit,. ean be imman-
ent J thea. _yaa... pJ'eol •• 1y the dlat1hctlOl18 among types ot 
SOrb14., AUa ve .. aunt, quae movent •• ip •• non solum quoad 
e*,-utt&'m Ilotua, sed et1a quoad 1ps... torma., quae· pOS'sunt 
ease pnnclplU1l motu 1_ quia non he.bent lIla. de1eJ'm1nat •• a na-
tlU'at •• d. aoquiH" iuaa p._unt. Bt buiuslJlodl e.t nta sens!-
tlva. Benneen1m 110et .int poant1a. opeWit1v •• ; tameD. ma:t:-
senl t01U1. 1ntentlonallbU81 qulbua .,"_ tm.luntuJt potent:t1., a quib ... taaquaa a Prin .. olp! • tOl'llBl1bua .t apeo1tlcat1v1aopeJlWtl-
tlone. sua. 4e"nd.ntc. Ullde 1st. mo4ua .. movend1 &1t1w.at 
quam moduli vitae .,.ge1;aU va.e, qu1a p1't1nolpta opeNnd1 non aunt 
tota11". deMm1nata a natUl'& slout 1n .. getattv!., •• d ad. ea 
poauJ'unt .e mo'feft, potent! .. en1m •• ult1ft. incUt1"erent •• I'Unt 
ad. bas vel1ll.u speoi •• e.u 01:>3"-. 
2!m4., All .. den1que .... nt .etp •• et1am quoad aeterminatIo-
n .. r· , qul. non habent a natul'a totaU tel' determinatum f1nem, 
.ed lUwn aib1 P2lU.,ttuunt. at 1ta non &guntup in oOSlloacendo 
tlnem, .,.<1 e". asunt 14eeque 1l'1d18ent ratione com-aNn_ propor-
tlauea ftn18 cum _41ia, at ale movent .. OJInl modo, quo ali qui d. 
8e movere poteat, sCU1cet. quoad t1neta at quoad tor.maa opeftndi 
et quoad eucution_ motu •• 
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llv1ngth1nga. 
3. the dlfterent t,pes of' l1:te have a common "terent in 
:matter, 011 the one hand, to whlcb tbe.y have dl£terent relational 
I 
and the,. have a 00_011 reterent .in pp1nc1pl.~ 9! !otlop., to wh1.h 
the,. have dlZteftnt J'$lations. 
4. !be.e %'elations auggeat not anI:,. a dlt'terence among the· 
t)'Pes of l.tvlng thinS'. but a S!9~ difference 1n which one t,p. 
1s aup • .-lor to another. fJ!he buis tor 8uperiol'lt,. 1n a certain 
grade o~ lite. St. fb(QU IlIa18, is tauna in the d.greeof luaan-
enoe in the be1ngt e aet1v1t7. fo the utent that the aotlvlt:r 
produced by a be111g hae ita oris!! .m and wrm1nate~ within that 
be1ns •. to that extent 14 that being hlgher than and aupel'1or to 
anotheSt whoae actInt,. i. not so immanent. The .. ord St. Thoma. 
118 •• to ex;p.rea .. tbJ.a .~ tn" 18 &~t1Jlm.1a. 8J7om the higher 
na~a, ~ prooee4 1%1 a m.ore 1nt1mate _y... ~ cevera • 
• 
n n fit 
21st. fhomaa .Con~ 9!B~.:I IV ,0. 11 t Pl"1nclpium autam 
hu1ua intent!oni. liIiie 1U'Si. opoptet, quod, aeoundum dlVfUMs1ta-
tem na't;ua.rum, dlV8J!'8W1 •• nat1on1. ~ mvenituP in "bus; at 
quanto allqua natuN. .at &It:1OPl tanto 14 quod ex ea amanat magi. 
eat In'S... In "'bull ena CIIIl bUll 1nan1JlVita oo,ppoPa in:t1JmmJ. 10-
C'W'Il tenet, In qu1bu.e uanatlone:$ ali.p .e.e non poasunt n1.1 1n 
aotionem tmtus eol'UJl. in aliquod alteJ'Um, 810 en1m ex 19ne sene"'-
tuP ign1a. dma ab 19ne corpua extN.Jl8\8l al.taMtur at ad qual1ta-
tela at .peal .. 19a.1a pJ'odl.l.eltur. Poe' 1Dan1ma_ veJtO eorpwa. 
p~ 100_ tenant plantae. In qu1bUl jam emnatl0 ex !ntePion 
procedl t f .inquantura "11106t ht.tr4oP plantae 1ntmneua in 8._n con 
veJ'titl.ut .t 111ud ._men 1;$%'1'&. mandatum creaclt 111 plantam. Jam 
ergo h10 primwl ga4ua vitae lnYenlturJ Dam vivent1a aunt quae 
aeipsa movent ad agendum. 1l1a vero quae non nUl •• 'enora movere 
posaunt OIIlino aunt vIta oarent1aJ in planti. vel'O hoc indicium 
vitae eat quod 14 q,uod. in ips1 •• at movet a11quaa formam. Bat " 
tamen 111t& plantarum 1aperfeeta" quia, emanatl0 1n .ia lice' ab ill 
iii 
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ot th1a '.".n1; ftpNaent. the .! RCNlter10d _,. wh1ch •• ha .... 
adopted to anal,-.e 11V1ns th1ns81 those natures whose activitie. 
~ more lntlma:be aft higher natu"_. 
m. DlO" tbe proper aetivlty of a nature begins and temin-
ate. Within that IlAt\U'8. tbe more -intimat.d 1t 18 J and the 1.8. 
It neede of what 1 •• xte1'1o~ to 1t, the higher 1s that nature and 
the mo1'e pel*tect 1e It. l.Ue. Far !nan1mate th1nga, theN ts no 
poa.lbl. ema1l&tlan .. ept by the .. t1on or OM upon another. 
!hi. la, ti"' of all, motion 1n tbe at,,1e' sens •••• condl7. the 
are ftri.oua ehem1eal aotlona atJ4 the "natural motiona" ot atomic 
, 
pari1el... In the .. -actlona.- however, one obJect (or paR) 
mOTe8 another ex"l'tmeoua to 1t. But "11v1ng tbJ.rlgl aN tboae 
iI' 
1nterioJ'1 prO(UJdat. tamen pw1at1m ab 1nttu·lonbua axten. quod 
emanat t1n&llt •• 08l1no enr1nsecum 1nv.n1turJ humor Rim Ubori8 
pJ'lmo ab arbon epe41ems tit fl_ at tan4em huotua ab 8.1"'boris 
corti" disc:retul, 8~ el ooUlp1iU8, pertNte aut_ b-uctu. ' 
omn1noab Q"bC" •• para .... at I 111 teft'Ul cadena, .em.ent1na rt~ 
tut. productt allam. p1antaa. 81 qu1a .tlam dll1pnte1' ocma1de~ 
ot, p~ bu1ua ~tlcm1. princ1plU1l ab ut;erlwl sum1tvJ nanJ 
bUlla. 1n~ .• cu.a autbona peSt mdin.. a tens. eum1 t~ de qua 
plGtalUc1plt nut~... Ulv.. plantarum v ••• vit_, a1t101' 
gftdua nil .. In:,en1tur, quae est eecUXldua an1 •• aena1t1vam, 
cu1ua .-:natl0 propria.tal at> .x.terio~ ino!plat. in 1n_u,lIj.ul 
te!l"lld.natuP, at, quanto ..... t1. _as. !no ... eft t ,tanto magi. a4 
tntt. " ..... ntt., •• nelb1le _1m exwri. tcm.m 8U1U11. eXMrio:ri-
bus •• nalbu8 lnger1t. a quibu8 Pl'ooecU.t 111 'mag1natlonem et ul-
t.rl\U1 1n .morlae 1ihe.au...... In quollbet t..." bu1ua emanation-
18 Pl"oc ... u pr1nelplum. .t termlnua pertinent ad divena, non en1m 
allqua potentla ... i'1va in •• 1pe_ retl.etltur. .., ergo hie 
grad,. vitae tanto alt10r qua vlta plantal"Ul11 quanta opeNtl0 
huins vitae -S18 in lut1m1s cont1netul', non taMn .at CImlino 
vita peP1"ecta, C'Wll emanatio tit '~1' ex uno in alterum. Est 
1s1tnlJ' eupreDlWl .t ptlrtectus 884\18 'Vitae, qu1 e8t .ecundUDl In-
tellectum. nul 1nteU"tua 1n •• 1pSlml re1"lectltur, et •• 1patml 
int.lUger. poteat. 
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wh1ch move the.elve. t-o act." And th1s moving ot oneself 1s 
.found in 1ts loweat tOl'm 1n plants. 
Fw, in planta, fA certain ttlntl'wlc humou:rft 18 convertftd to 
... d *len. with tbe aetlan of the 8011, 18 eonve:pted Into an-
other plant. fbi. presence 1n a plant of a principle that 1s the 
cause of & tcmat 18 a aign of lite. Port the cause ot to:rm can 
be onl7 anothertoftl.- Whioh, belDS an lntJl'!nel0 principle of 
action, aets through the whole being to pJtOduce what eventuall,. 
Is auotlwz- ot the same speci •• with the sa. power or :reproduc-
tlon. In the plant, howeve~, theN 18 0'ft17 an !nwerfeet I1fe. 
tC'll!, although tlW emenatlan p~ed. tl'Ola wIthin, ,...t little 0" 
11tt1. 1t 1s exteplol"l •• d until at 1 .. , 1t U c~1etel,. othel' 
than 1-' p,.wl.ple • .As a matter of rut, eftl1 the tt •• t pr1nol-
pl. of tb1a veptatlw emanation Is 8C1Jl111th!ng extrinsio to tbe 
plant. tor 11; I'M.!"". 1. nQ11lJlahilent tPCm the 8011, and through 
. . 
lMUlJ' prooe.8ea tbat n8tlP1aluDent 1s convened into sari. 
But the" 1s a hlghel' .torm ot lite: tbat of the .ensitive 
soul wh10h 18 fotmd in an1mela. Although ita pPOper emanation 
proceed. boa without, £w ,he .e1180 I*$oel ve. the impression of 
extemAl objects, 1&t 1t. teN1nates with1n. i'h18 activity be-
C011l8S moM and more lntrb:la10 (more and more 1nt1mate) u the 
emanat10n proceeds hOUl the .xtemal GEmS •• to thfl 1mag1natlon 
and even to the sense LJell.Ol"1_ Even in th1a emanation, h01l'8V81', 
there i8 a dltferenee of sub Jeot with 1'espeot t:o the beginning 
and the end of the aotivity. Por, u St. !hQIIU points out. "ne 
aeneitive paws%' reflecta upon itself." Therefore, While this 
grade ot lUe 18 h1gbe:a- than plant lUe, at111 it 18 also imper-
teet. beoaUiG the p,,1:nciple ot the vlta.l act1v1t7 18 other than 
the tem_ It 1s the powz- ~ .eU-.. tleot1on, lmowledge ot ~ .. 
•• If. that 1nd1eate. the pa:rteotlon ot l1re, and th1s perfection 
18 bad in llh- -aocol"41ng to intellect .. It 
St_ !'h.alIIi."#, howe'Mr» polDta out that there aft 488ft.. ot 
1nteUeotual llte.g lbe 1 .... 1. tbe hwIan, tor, although man 
18 able to Ntleet upaa. himself, at111 the fl:rat Sourc8 ot his 
knowledgft 00lle8 tl'QlD; without. am fa lntelleotual. knowledge de-
panda upon pbarltuma. 'Ih18 1s no't ... inVinal0 depttndeneeJ but, 
o ... quent to the bod,...ou1 unit that man b,a11 knowledge in 
80ae -7 hu 1ta _lain in sene. and Ie theftt .. !.!a Q!FJl!!eco. 
And to "peat 0110. mON, becaus. the aotual operation ~ 'I..lnde~ 




powe~ o~ a subsistent soul.24 
the knowledge which an ~l baa t St. fbomas continues J need 
no beginning t:rom. things outs1de ~ him; to that extent 1t 1s en .. 
tirel,. intr1naio. But to unde%tatand. in an angel, i.other than 
to be. fh1B 41ft"1.,." theref'Ol"'$, pNvents the angel from. poa. 
aessing the full pe~ectlon of life. 
0l'll7 in GOd, then, in Whom to understand 18 the same a8 to 
be, 18 eOD\Plete '1JIIt8Jl(tnce, cOlJiJPlete 1nt.1macy of activity :round, 
and theretore, in GOt.'l theNt is the perfectIon ot 11te. 
:lotto. that It 18 1lIportant to realtM the bu1a tor validl,. 
p1'ed1_t~ Ute ~ 4'l1Pla and ot God. In the 8econd ohapter, we 
a.paNted lite !rca an7 mate1'1al Um1 tattoo; in this chapter .. 
have seen to .. greater extent how the activities or lite are pJl'Op 
• I 
$KSt. !.b.omaa axpla1ns the dUt'el"ent _,.. in 'Whicb the senee 
and 1I1.11eot uae bod1.. in thetr act or knowing in I PI '-. 
leot. 8,. 119.eo. )Jam 1n_111p" quod&l:!l'l'lledo .et ppop~~ , 
quoda'llaOdo •• t OGttJ'uftotl. Se1endwa •• t 19i'hl". quod al1qua op$r-
atic ani._ aut paaal0 •• t quae 1nd.lget o.,,01'e aleut Ins~n­
to .t alout objeoto.11ou! vide" 1nd1get corpo:re, slout objeo-
to, quia oolor, qui ea' objeotum Yiaus. ..t in CQllPOl'th Item 
aiou' lDatl'WD8nto, qu1a "t'1Il0, etat altab an1ma. non. est taman 
nial 118"'- organ_ vla_. 8OWoet pupilla, quae est u' 1nat~­
tum, .t .10 Y1dere non eat an1.se tantum, .ed .at o:rganl. Altqua 
aUMm .1'&t10 .at, quae 1nd1pt oOl'POre, non tamen ateut lnstw-
mento, aed aiout objecto tantum.... Hoe modo phantasmata s. ha-
bent ad. inteUectua. .1eu' 0010"' ad Y1aum...... mx heo duo .... 
quun~. U'n.u1a eat, quod 1ntelllaeN .st pJ-OPria OJ)eJPat10 an1me.e, 
et non 1n4iget COJlpOM nisi ut 00 " .. to 'bantum, u1; dlotrua .at., 
vldere auha .t all.eoperetlone •• t pae.lon •• non aunt anima. 
tantum, sed oonittnOtl. Aliud eat, quod habet operat1enem pep .•• , 
habet .t1a .Ne et subslatontl_ per 841' at tllu4, quod non ha-
bet open.1;1onem pel' 8C1f non habet •••• P." se.Bt Ideo bttel1e.-
tus est tozw.8ubelstens, alia. pot.nt1ae aunt torma. in mater1a. 
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erly and essentially oalled "1nlm8nent" and are not to be limited 
to vegetative activities. Therefore, siven the existence of 
angels and of God, if their activity is intellectual, as it must 
be, then they are said to live and to live in a much more perfect 
--
way than any material l1ving thing. 
SELIcil_PERFECTION OR ttASEITAS. n The various modes 01' life, 
therefore, are graded according as the source and term. of aotiv-
ity are intimate to the living thing. ~le perfect state of such 
intimacy is called "aseitas" by M. Tornatore.25 This is probably 
best rendered in English as tfselt-perfection. It To move oneself, 
then, in the wide use of the term motion, belongs to living 
things; and the more perfectly a thing moves itself as rar as the 
possession of principle and term of motion, the more perfect its 
1ife.26 For any activity there are three "partsn : the princi-
ples of the activity, the activit~ itself, and the term or the 
activity. ~~e proportionate perfection of immanent activity con-
25J • B. Tornatore, tiDe Vita eiusque Gradibus,tt Divus Thomas (Piacenza) vol. 1, p. 93: Hmo jam videre est, qua ratIone vIta 
vel in primo sui ac 1.Uli va rsali ori oonceptu importet quamda!ll asei-
tatem, in 1psaque consiatnt; quod at sparta exprimunt ipsaa die-
tionas: ex. se L10tUl1l habere; agere se i secundum quod operantur ex 
se ipsis. Quum vero sseitas sit perfectionum maxima. consequltur 
vitam esse ultimam viventis perrectionem, fastigium ao veluti 
caput, ;PrO OuillS conservations facile omnia dabit. Vita a.utem eo 
erit per eaffor in vlvente, quo perTectlor aseltas. 
28st. Thomas, S. Th., I, 18, 3 c: Ad euius ev1dentiam censid 
erandum est quod cum nvera dicantur aliqua secundum quod operan-
tur ex seipsis, at non quasi ab aliis mota; quanto perfectius 
competlt hoe alieui, ta.nto perfectlus in eo invenitur vita. 
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alata in juat th1s 1 to what extent are the •• parts identified' 
fhat What we caU "11£.- consists 1n some kind of autonomous ao-
tivity. no one will den,._ !bat there can be no mo" autonomous 
actlv1t,. tban wben principles of aotlv1t7, aotlvlt,. itaelf, and 
teN of aotiv1t7 al'e lrltr1nBic to the open'ing 8ubjeot ls like-
w18e evident. A U'i'tle "flectIon wUl autt10e to show tbat th1a 
1, t1"Ue anl,. 1n an 1ftteUeet know1ns 1t.81t when suoh tnt.ne.-
tion 18 identical with the YeJl7 be1l1g of the knower. BaV'1llg 
pnved that God exlata and 1s lntelUpnt, 1t toUowaneoe.ear117 
that Be 1s n- own \U1defttanding Of HtIIselr.S7 Ue 1s the knower,. 
ill no -7 dependent upon arqth1ng out.lde B1lueU t. the 80Ul'0e 
o'E Hi. knowledge (foil no$b1ng but Riuel" 18 the adequate ob j80t 
ot' .lt1s knowlodge), and. the term ot H18 knowledge, Hl. Idea of H 
•• It ... ob3 •• ' w11:h ftlat1an to !I_elf ... knower, 18 noth.1ng but 
Bis 41vSne •••• no. it.elf .. 1dentlty it.elf., but oalled knower 
• 
and kn01lll beoau .. of' cu.r poor 'Wldewtandlng of the activit,. o£ 
God. In thls a,. 18 tbe aetInt,.. of God .os1; !m.manent. moet in-
r ft, U J 
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tlmate, most truJ:y.lih. Other be1ngsal"'$ sald to live in so tar 
as they apprcx1mate this intimacl of kn01lfl.nf3 op.el.J~lf<IJ 
.An angel29 knows himselt dlNOt17J ,..t his !mo"ledge or him-
selt 1s not b1s very essence. i!lel'e 1s a .kind ot compos 1 tion in 
the ~l'. natuN, the:re 1s a composltion (bealdes 8aeenee and··· 
existence) of .alene. and act ~ knowle4ge,29 a oomposition ana..;. 
logoua to the o amp oei tlon of material beIngs. For an angel 18 n 
a pePt'$ct 1lltIaterlal. being such as·G04 is. Although the angel'. 
c0lJtP081tlon 1. 1n the Umater1al order, at111 1t 18 a composItion 
a ltp&l'b-to-parttt anal.ogoua to matter'. ftpart-outs1de-ot-pal"ti." 
Sueh a o01.'q)oalt1onputa the angel 'e power tor intimate 1lmtanent 
ao"i vit,. ~l_ that 0'1 the purel., simple lnaaterlallty that God 
1s. JIan, or hS.e aaWN pal'tly EteJl'lal, 18 dependent upon that 
matter (in hi. pft8ent _tate) toe the beg1mdng oE h:la intel.leo-
t1on. POI' although, .. 1I1teUeot, he too can know h1msel.t. such 
• 
·.t. thoaa. a f Qcc'" Gentes, III !_ .. 91sAdhuo, na~ 8upel'l 
or in .\10 1Dt1mo oEtiliiit1 naEiem lnr.no"m1n .jus supremo. 
lfattiJ'a au",- Sntel1 .. tullla •• , auper107 oorpOMlt, cont1ng1t au-
tem e .. secunda illquem pa.rbemau1 quae eat anima ·1ntellectlva. QI.'JOJ't., ts11N1' quod, 8icut oorpus pertectum per an1.J.llam tntell.eo-
tiva 8St aupNl'tl'UJlt 111 gene" oorp02'UJ1, ita anima lntellective. qua 
unltlu- COl'PO'ri 81t 1nt1-. 1n genere substantlarum 1ntelleotuallum 
Sunt 18ltuzt al.1quae substantiae 1ntellao'trualea non unit •• carpor! 
bus, auperlo~.8ecundUII natU8e Ol!'Uinem 1IUt.1ltta. Se. also Oontra 
~tea, n. c~ 97.· 
29st• fhamas,S.fb.., I, N, 3 0; Actue ad quem c~tur 
potentia ope:ratlva-; en opei-atl0. In an.gelo autem non est idem 
1ntel11gew ot e •• 8 J nee a11qua a11a operatio aut in ipso, aut in 
quooumque al10 cl'eato, est Idem quod ejus esse. unde assentia an 
gell non est. 'us potentia :tntel1ec tiva.1 nee al10ujua cl'9atl ea-
sent1a eat eius operatlva potentia. 
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selt-knowledge i8 poasible only att.,. his intellect has been 
actuated b7 a spec1 •• frOlll the matter ot his senses. 'fhua .. his 
knowing 18 les8 intimate. les. immanent, 1.8. of I1te than that 
of an angel or of' God 
-
8ena1t1ve anS.mallqr has no powr of' seU-Mf'leet1on owing to 
1ta cQtJ.\Plete 1lmle1'81on 1n matter w1thout a subs1sting immaterial 
toa that 18 able to l!'8tlect upon iuelt of itself (even though. 
as 1n the oa •• ot man, 1t may need the _,tel'" of its ref'leot1QU 
~ without) til It baa an analogous •• If-arnowledge, 1n that 1t 
knowe. sena1hl,-, what 18 good far 1t ( •• l1'-p1"'otectlcm, food) and 
can reproduce 1 ta sPMles.. !he plant bu no Pl~le4e whatsoever 
but 1ta .ot1v1t7 18 aleo dil"&cted 1;. 1ta OlIn inCJI84a8 and aelt-
prod:u.etlon. fl»l'Gtow_ 1t baa a care t_ it •• U whlch fall .. 
upon aoz.ae Ion ~ Imowledge, alba!t, not 1_ own. 
In th1I -7 1M h. to a •• rtam extent how all th.1np aha" 
• 
in the peJ'1'e.t existence of God. !heir sharing, ot cGUNe" Is 1n 
a sreatl,- 1ap$l"t'eot ... ." but attU thea.eltas p~per to God. al 
t p 
18 "fleeted 1n plant lU8 and even in the d~o e:dstenoe of 
non-i! Y1ns th.blge. 
SlJDA.Rr. 'lhua tar our inve.tigation ot 11v1ng thing, hU 
concluded to J 
1. o.PeJltlt1onall,., lite U the capacity t~ 1aanent actlv-
1~. What th18 impUes w11l. be taken up in the last chaptex-. 
2. It. ph1losophic«1 ana1,..1a of material I1fe 1n terms of 
6e 
causes "s.paratedft t'x-<ml conditions" leads us to conclude to It de-
tin1 tlon that transcends material 111'e., 
3. t'hus, "lU.- 1a ,more extensive than "soul" J tor sepa-
rated substance. and God m.mself, 'becaus. the,. have immanent ac-
tivities, are aaid to l1.ve, but without a "principle of life,· a 
Boul.30 
4. the pe3!'teetlQD or 11t •• being the pe:r.-feot immanence of 
actlv1t'11n which pnnciple, activity, and tex-m are identical ... 18 
found in God. Othe,. th1ngs 11ve with a 11te more OP less pe~eet 
u their activIty approaehes or reo.d •• trom the pertect10n of' 
the activity of God. 
5. In chapter tour. _ wUl draw out the impl1cations of 
the principles and conolusions we have estabUshed in these f1l'St 
three cb.apte~, espeoially with regard to relatIng our operation-




1'0 conclude: Jlhat 1ntu1t1on, What wight has this anaJ.ysls 
ot 11fe given ua? rha !Might is three-told: 
lOst. !ho .. , S.p., I, 18, 3 ad 2aAd $ootUld1.ua d1oendum, 
quod stout DeUIJ es1 ipswa .\lura $S'''~ et auum mte1l1geJle, 1 t& et 
anum Ylve".. Bt pJropte,. hOG 810 Tivit, quod non habet Y1vendl 
p;r1nclpS:ua. S •• alao ibid., ad 3: Ad _"tum dleendua, quod 
vita in letta lnfer1Ol!"t13ua ",1pitur 1n nat\tft oolt'Upt1bl11, quae 
1ndlset at gene rat lane ad cOI18el"Vatlonem speelei, of; al1mento ad 
canaenatlon8'm lndlvldul. lit pl'Opter hoc in iat18 Interionbus 
non lnvenitur vIta sine anima veget.1bl11. Sed hoc non habet lo-
cum in :rebua 1ntlonuptibl11bus. 
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1. There are ~rad.es w dames among living things; not 
only is the~ Ute. but there are ldnds of 11f'e, differing as 
more and lesa perfect. 
S. !he measure of the perr.,etlan of 11te 1s found in the 
intimacy ,0%" selt-p08s.ss1on of the vit .. l activity. 
3. fida 41ttex-enee 1n the degl'ee ot pel'i'"ectlon lndicates 
the analogows natu& or lite .. whioh Will be discussed at length 
in the next ohap"r. 
CHAPTER IV 
~ Detinition~ Motion, operation, Substantiality 
That being is said to have life which throu@k and of it-
self has nourislwwnt, increase, and decrease. It must 
be understood, however, that this explanation is more by 
way of example than by way of definition. For, it is 
not of this alone that a thing has increase and decrease 
that it lives, but a thins is said to live also because 
it senses and understands and is able to perfor.m other 
Vlorlcs proper to life. From this consideration we see 
tilat there is lite in the separated substances for this 
reason, that they have intellect and will (as is clear 
in the eleventh book of the Iileta*hysicS), although there 
is no growth or nourishment in ~ em. But because in 
these generable and corruptible things, the vegetati va 
soul to which nourishment and growth pertain (as was 
said at the end ot the first book) is the prinCiple ot 
life, here there is given by way of example of that 
"having life," that which has nourish.."'"OOnt and growth. 
The proper ratio of li£e, however, is from this that a 
thing is of sueE a nature as to move itself, taking mo-
tion in the wide sense, in so f'ar as the intelleotual 
operation 1s called some kind of motion. For, we say 
that a be1ng is without lii'o whioh oan be moved only by 
an exterior souree.l " 
This text serves both as a sumt.'t\Sry of what we have seen and 
as an introduotion to what tollows. It emphasizes the "separated" 
1st. Thomas, In II De Anima, lect. 1, fi.~19: Illud autem di-
c1tur habere vltam-;-quod" per selpsam habet allmentum, augmentum 
et decrementum. Sciendum autem. est, quod hoc explanatio magis 
est per modum exempli, quam per modum de1"initionls. Non enim ex. 
hoc solo quod aliquid habet Qugmentum et decrementum vlvit, sed 
et1am ex hoc quod sentit at intelligit, et alia opera vitae exar-
cere poteat. unde in substantlis separatis est vita ex hoc quod 
habont intelleotum et voluntatem, ut patet in undecimo 14etap~1-
~, 11cet non s1 t in eis augmentum et alimentum. Sed qilla . 
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character of life, its non-dependence, of itself, upon material 
conditions; and also it re-lntroduces tlmotiontt which we will now 
study under another aspect: its relation to operation. 
rJOTION VS. Oi'EHATI01J. St. Thomas often uses terms in very 
analogous ways; it is practically impossible to determine one pre-
cise meaning f'or a term. This is especially the case Vii th ftl::lO '" 
tion. tt It has been said :many times that a living thing is that 
which is able to "move itself." As we pointed out in the second 
chapter, this phrase ~1ay have two meanings: one, signif'ying the 
transient action of one part of a living thing upon another part 
of itself'; the ather signifying an operation itself. We will now 
investigate this second use of "move oneself't by doing two things: 
1) by adequately distinguishing motion in the strict sensefram 
operation; and 2) by determining why operation is widely or even 
improperly said to be self-motion. 
First of all, st. Thomas points out that a thing is said to 
be living when one of the two types of motion is found in it: 
that motion whereby one paX't moves another part, or that :motion 
lstis generabilibus et corruptibilibus anima, quae est in plantis, 
ad quam pertinent allmentum at augmentum, ut in fine primi dictum 
est, princ1pium est vitae, ideo hic quasi GXGm.plarlter exposult 
Mbabens vi tam, ff id quod habet alimentum et au.gm.entum. propria 
autem ratio vitae est ex hoc -, quod aliquid est natum movere seip-
sum, large accipiendo maturo, prout etiam intellectualis operatio 
motus qu1dam dioitur. En enim sine vita osse dlcimus, quae ab 
exterior! tantum principia moveri possunt. 
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or operation that is itself as end.2 With regard to the first 
type. this motion may be considered as racei ved and in this res-
-
pect is motion in the strict sense, the act of that which is in 
potency and in so far as it is in potenoy. This type ot motion is 
called actus imperfect.i; such motion is successive and in time. 3 
Correlative to this uperfection" (actus) which belongs to that 
.. 
which exists in potenoy, is that motion whioh is produoed by that 
whioh is actual. 4 This latter is transient aotion. As we saw 
before. although this action proceeds :from. a being whioh is in 
aot, it is the perfection of another and so is identified with the 
2st • Thomas, s. ~., I, 18, 1 e: Ex quo patet quod 111a pro 
prie aunt viventla7 quae seipaa seoundum aliquam speclem motus mo-
vent; sive accipiatur motus proprie, sicut motus dlcltur actus im-
perfecti, Id est existentis in potentia; sive motus acciplatur 
comnnmiter, prout motua dicitur etiam actus perfecti; prout intel-
ligere at sentlre dieuntur moveri, ut dicitur (De Anima); ut sie 
viventia dicantur quaecumque se agunt ad motum,-Vel operationem 
ali quam. Ea voro in quorum natura non est ut se agant ad aliquem 
motum vel operationem, viventla dici non possunt, nisi per aliq 
slm1Iitudlnem. 
3s t. Thomas, s. Th., I"'II, 31, 2 ad 1: Motus duplic1te:ro 
dicitur; uno modo,-qmest actus imperfectl, scilicet existentls 
in potentia, inquantum huiusmodiJ at taIls motus est successlvus 
at in tempore. See als 0 In IV Sent. d. 17, 5, :5 ad l: Ad pri.mum 
ergo dleendum, quod motusauplirni'r dicitur, ut patet in 3 De 
Anima (text. com. 28). Est enim quidarn motus qui est actus !iii-
perTectl, qui est exitus de potentia in actum; et talis oportet 
quod sit succeasivus, quia semper expectat aliquid in futurum ad 
perfectianem suae speciel, eo quod pars motuB est alterius speciei 
a toto motu. ut dicitur in 10 Eth. (cap. 2 vel 4) •••• 
-
4st • Thomas, s. ~n., I, 53, 1 ad 2: Ad secundum dicendum, 
quod l'llotus exlstentis-Yn potentia est actus imperfectl. Sed motus 
qui est secundum app1icatlonem virtutis, est existentis in actu, 
quia virtus rei est secundum quod actus est. 
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first type of motion; their distinction is one of source and re-
cipient. In oontrast to these two "motions" 1s that "motion" 
which is a perfection of the one acting, not, however, in so far 
as the one acting is potential in same way; but precisely as the 
one aoting is in act. is he perfected by this type of motion. 
This motion is the actt~ perfect!; !t is non-successive and ~ !i 
self is not in time. Such are the activities ot sensing and 
understanding.5 
The difference, then, betilsen the act of' that which is impel' 
fect and the act of that which is perfect, is that the first is 
not the perfection of the agent, but of that which is moved .. 
Thus. the act of the perfect is called "motion" only through a 
likeness with strict motion, in so far as both are "perfections," 
the one of' that Which exists in potency, the other ot that which 
" 
Sst. Thoma.s$ In IV Sent., 17, 5, 3 ad 1: Alius motus est 
actus ;e2rfectl, q'l..ir"magis operatio dl.citur, qu1 non expeetat 0.11-
qUId in l'uturum ad eomplementum suae speciei, sieut sentire; at 
talis motus non est successivus, sed subltus; et s1 contingat quod 
talls motus sit in tempore, hoc orit per accidens, quia mensuratur 
in quolibet instanti illius temporis in quo dicitur ess& •••• 
Thus. that which is no way is tendin£} to peri'ection, but is ulti-
mate perfection, is entirely w!£hou£ motion; this is (lod.-In II 
Sent. j 11, 2, 1 0: Respondeo dieendum quod secundum Philos'ophum, 
"OPe"ratio at motus di,fferunt: operatio enm est actus perfect!, 
ut lucid! lucero. et intellectus in actu, intelligere; sed motus 
est actus imperfect! tendentis in perfectionem; et ideo id quod 
est in sua ultima perfections, habet operationem sine motu, sicut 
Deus J quod autem dlstat ab ultima perfections, habet operatianem 
canjunctam motui •••• 
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exists in act. 6 Since, however, the .form of a thing is the prin-
ciple of its actions, al"l.d it is by the torm that the thing is in 
act and acts, when we say that immanent aotion is the act oi' the 
perfect, this is not to be understood only in a causal sense. 
Such an u..'I'1derstandlng would merely show how it dl1'fers from mo-
tion in the strict senSe. This understanding, however, does not 
show its distinction trom transient action; for all actions pro-
ceed from a being in act and in so far as it 18 in act.7 Rather, 
nact of the perfect" must also be understood formally} that is, 
not only is it an aot ot a pl"inciple that has been perfected, but 
it Is, eVen more, a perfection in the formal sense ot that agent 
itself in the very respect in which that agent is in act.8 It is 
Sst. Thomas, s. Th., I, 18, :5 ad 1: \:~uarum haee est dif'fer-
entia, quia prima actTO non est perfectl0 agentls, quod movst,. 
sed ipsius motl; secunda autem actio, est peri"ectio agentis. 
tJnde, quia motus est aotus mobilis, secunda actiO, in quantum. est 
actus oporantls, die1tur motll.s eius ex hac similltudlne, quod, 
siout motus est actus mobilis, ita hujusmodi a.ctio est notus 
agentis; lieet motus sit actus imperfect! scilicet existentis in 
potentla, hujusmodi autem actio sit actus perfect!, id eat, axis-
tentis in actu. 
7St • Thomas, Quneet. DiSi- de Veritate, 8, 6 c: Hae autem 
duae a.ctiones in hoc conven unt quoo utraque non progreditur nisi 
ab existente in actu, secundum quod est aotu •••• 
SA. Laurent, "De Natura Actionis !lmnanent1s Secundum S. T'no-
mam, tt Dr vus !I'boma.s (Piacenza) vol. 41 (1938) p. 235: Unde quando 
dloitur actiOnem lm.nmnentem esse actum perfect1, hoe non debet in 
telligi causa1iter tantum (s10 enim solummodo ostendum elus dii"-
ferentia a motu proprie dicto), sed debet inte111gI formallter, 
scilicet: est actus non tnntum a1lculus prinoipii quod iam est 
perfectum, sed est formaliter perfectl0 ipsius agentls ut lueere 
est perfectl0 lucidi. And on p. 236: Uhde talls actio quae pro-
pria operatio vacatur, jure dicitur formallter aotus peri"ectl. 
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such an action -- an immanent action -- whioh is properly called 
"operation.1t This is formally the actus p!rfecti. 
Now, since it is evident that acts ot sensing and understand 
ing (in man) are successi va and in time ~ what oan be the meaning 
ot St •. Thomas when he characterizes the actus Rerfecti as non-
temporal? To understand this, let us first consider Aristotle's 
distinction between aotuality and movement as it appears in the 
Metaphpics:9 
Since of the actions which have a limit none is an end 
but all are rela ti va to the end, e. g., the removing of 
.fat or fat-removal, and the bodily parts themselves when 
one is making them thin are in movement in this way (i.e., 
without being already that at which the movement aims) , 
this is not an action or at least not a complete one 
(for it is not an end) J but that movement in which the 
end is present is an action. E.g., at the same time we 
are seeing and have seen, tal"e understanding and have 
understood, are thinking and have thought (while it is 
not true that at the sarae time We are learning and have 
learnt" or are being cured and have been cured). A t the 
same time we are living well and PAve lived well, and are 
happy and have been happy. If not, the process wouid have 
had sometime to cease; as the process of making thin 
ceases; but, as things are, it does not cease; we are 
living and have lived. Of' these processes, then, we must 
call the one set movements, and the other actualities. 
In this text, Aristotle points out that actions are to be 
distinguished as those which are ends in themselves and those 
which are relative to ends. Those which in themselves are ends, 
those which represent in themselves an actuality are different 
than those which are processes to something; this is a distincti 
9 Aristotle, Meta., 1048 h.tS-28. 
phy;sics are from vr:-t1. Hoss. 
Transla ti ons or the ltIeta-
-
which suggests st. Thomas' distinction l!.! ~ and.!!! .. t ..... i_e .... r ... l. 
:E.'very "movementn is incomplete; every "actualIty" is complete. 
There is a distinction as part from part between that which is be-
ing moved from that which is moved; but on the other hand, it is 
one and the same thing at the same time that sees and has seen. 10 
(St. Thomas agrees with Aristotle in his commentary on this 
text.ll ) In this sense, then, are sensing and understanding non-
temporal: the act itself admits no before and after. 
_ ........ --....... 
The impor-
taut distinction to be made in this regard is that movement my 
accompany operation (or tlactuality") but is something distinet 
fronl it. 
In every created thing, the essence differs from its esse 
and is cOlnpared to it as potency to act. But the act"""t"C) 
10Ibld., l04Sb29-34: For every movement is incomplete -- mak-
ing thIn; learning, walking, building; these are movements, and 
incomplete at that. For it is not true that at the same~ time a 
thing is walking and has walked, o.r is building and has built, or 
Is coming to be and has corne to be, or is being moved and has bee 
moved, but what 1s being moved 1s di.fterent from what has been 
moved, and what is movins from what has moved. But 1 t is the same 
thing that at the same time has seen and is seeing, or is thinld 
and has thought. The latter sort of process, then, I eall an ac-
tuality, and the tormer a movement. 
11St. Thomas" In IX Meta., lect. 8, #1862: Quia enim dixerat, 
quod opus est finis, posm-aliquis credere t quod hoo asset verum 
in omnibus. Sed ipse hoc removet, dicene, quod quarumdam activar 
um potent1arum ultimus finis est solus usus potentiae, et non ali 
quid operatum per actionem potent1a.e; sicut ultimus finis poten-
tiae visiv8e est visio, at praeter sam non tit 8 potentia visiva 
a.liquod opus operatum. 
75 
which is compared the operative potency is operation.l~ 
Since a creature is not its own act of sensing or act of under-
standing, it is not its own sense or intellective power. (Intel-
ligence is a. power whose act is inmlBnent, as we saiV above I and 
whose act is of the per:rect~d] I as we shall see.) "In this in.-
stance the act or the potency -- that is the act ~ which II !!. 
put !n ..!S! -- is followed by an action that is intrinsic to the 
being. This is the key to the meaning of act~ Rorfecti. n13 St. 
Thomas, in his commentary on the .!?! Anima,14 points out that the 
operation referred to in sensation, 1s the act of the sense which 
had already been made in aet through the sensible species. Mo-
tion, then, applied to the act of sensing (or understanding) 1s 
different than physical motion. 
12st. ThOlnas, !_ .:fa •• I, 54. 3 e: In amn1 aut em oreato assen-
tia dlrrert a suo esse et oamparatur ad Ipsum sicut potentia ad 
aotum. Actus autem ad quem comparatur potentia operativa est 
operatic. 
13M• Miller, ltproblem of Action in the Comnentary of st. 
Thomas on the Physics of Aristotle.," Modern Schoolman. vol. 23, 
p. 151. ( Italic s mine) • . " • 
14st. Thomas, In III De Anima, "leet. 12: Et quia omne, quod 
est in potentia, Inquantum-hujusmodl, est tmperfeotum ideo i11e 
motus est actus imperfecti. Sod iate motus est actus perfecti: 
est enim operatio sensus jam facti in aetu, per suam speciem. 
Non enim sentire convenit sensul nisi in actu existenti; et ideo 
iate motes (Sicl simpliciter est alter a motu physico. Et hujus-
modi motu8 dlcrtur px'oprie operatio, ut sentlre et intelligere et 
velle. Et secundum h1.IDC m.otum anima movst seipsam. 
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Sense or intellect therefore, is said to undergo change, or 
to suffer only in this way tha.t there is a reception of species ;16 
but "with respect to the act following the sense or intellect per 
focted by species" there is no passio or motus but only the actus 
perfectl.l6 The passive element in immanent activities, then, 
pertains to the reception of a perfection or specification by for-
mal object that is the principle of' the activity, but not the ac-
l5Even this is not a proper use of aat,l says st. Thomas, In 
III Sent., d. 15, 2, 1, qat. 11, c: Se q\ua patentiae apprenen-
sl vai'""'S'ensi ti vae sunt ta..'"ltum in roclplendo speciem, quae quidem 
non recipitur in sensu per modum rel, sed per modum intentianis; 
ideo in operatlane harum vivlum est quldem aliquo modo pati, quan-
tum ad hoc quod sunt vires materiales, et quantum ad hoc quod ali-
quld reclpitur (et propter hoc dlcitur in 2 de Anima text. 52, 
quod sentlre est quodda..."ll pati). Sed quia senaus non movetur a 
senalblll secundum condltlanem moventls, cum forma sens1bi1ia non 
recipiatur ln sensu secundum esse materlale prout est in senslbi-
11, sed secundum esse splrituale, quod est proprium sensu! (unde 
non habet contrarietatem ad sensum, sed est perf'ectio elu.a, nlsl 
secundum quod ex.eedl t proport1onem sensus); ldeo non propI'le 
dlc1tur pat!, nisl secundum quod e.xcellentia sensibl1ium"oorrum-
pit sensum, aut debl11tat. 
16st • Thomas, In 1 Sent., 40, 1, 1 ad 1: Operatio semper est 
perfecti, ut patet-rn sensu: sentire enim est quaedam opeI'atio 
sent1entis, neo pI'ocedens in effectum a11quem circa sensiblle, 
sed magis secundum quod species sensibilis in ipso est; tmde sen-
tire quantum ad lpsum receptlonem speclel sensibllis naminat pas-
sionem, simillter at intel1igere quod etla.'k'J.1 pati quoddam est, ut 
in 3 De Anlma (text. 2) dlcl tur: Sed quant'lml a.d actum oonsequen-
tam 1psum sensum peI'fect'lml per speciem nominat operatlonem, quae 
dicitur motus sensus, de quo dicit Ph11osophus (In 3 De Anima, 
text. 11) quod est actus perfecti. --
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tivity itself. l ? Such a specification or reduction from potency 
to act is characteristic only of beings that in some way are in 
potency and are not pure act. Having been put into act, there is 
no longer a question of a tranSition trom potency to act; rather, 
it is the developlnent of a perfectlon already possessed, an in-
crease in actuality.1S Father Laurent calls it a superabundantia 
17G• P. Klubertanz, S.J., ~le PhilosoFhZ of Human Nature, pp. 
90-91, has this to say about toe-passIvity o~en~ operation: 
Inasmuch as same immanent operations involve the reception of an 
act, perfection, or for.m, and all immanent operations are speci-
fied by their objects as by a formal principle, they can be calle 
passive. But ••• tl~e passion correlative to a transient action is 
the reception of a perfection from an agent, in place of a per-
fection formerly possessed. The passive immanent operation (as 
far as the immediate efficient or eliciting cause is concerned) is 
f'rom the i>atient itself'; the specification from the object does 
not of itself Imply efficient causality; and when the object has 
acted ef'ficiently upon the yatient the reception does not involve 
the loss of a perfection formerly possessed.... In our experi-
ence, every passive immanent operation actually implies a prior 
reception of a perfection. A tlpure" immanent operation would be 
passive only in the sense of being specified by its object. This 
pure irmnanencG.is partly exemplified in the intuitive self-knowl-
edge of the angels" and entirely exempli.fied in the Divine knowl-
edge. 
last. Thonw.s exemplifies);Jy way ot knowledge" In II De Anima, 
lect. 11, 1,367: Manifestat (!r1stoteleil utrum quoo edue!tur de 
potentia in aetum scientiae patiatur. It primo man1festat hoc 
circa id quod educitur de secunda potentia in actum purum. Secun 
do autem manifestat hoc circa ld quod edueitur de potentia prima 
in habitum.... Dicit ergo primo, quod habens scient1am, id est 
habitualiter selens, fit actu speculans. Sed hoc aut non est ve 
et proprie alte~ari et pati; quia, ut dictum est, non est propria 
passio at alteratio, cum de potentia proeedit in acturn, sed cum 
allqu1d de ccntrario mutatur in contrarium. Cum autem habituali-
ter sciens, flt speeulans actu, non mutatur de contrario in con-
trarium, sed proficit in eo quod jam habet. Et hoc est quod diei 
quod "est additio in ipsum, at in actum. ff Addit'lJ.Z9 enm ei perfec 
tio secundum quod proficit in actum. 
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actus.19 
With respect to the principle of the activity, then, a livin 
thing may be said to be !,loved to nct in that respect in which its 
living-powers are potencies distinct trom its substance: but this 
motion is not the actus perfect,i, the immanent action proper to 
lif"e. Rather, once put into act, the living-power nets with an 
increase ot actuality: the (further) perfection of that which has 
been perfected. This activity, then, a Simple pertection, is the 
actus Fartecti, applicable evon to God -- with the qualIfication, 
of course, that His vital activity has no need to he put into 
act.20 
With respect to the term ot the activity, st. Thana.s points 
out that we expect "operation" to produce something.21 This pro-
duct or term of the activity either remains within the agent or is 
produced outside ot it. But the tact that a product remains with 
" 
in the agent is not the reason 1'01" calling the operation immanent. 
19r,aurent, "De Natura Actionis IIl"lllWllentis," P. 237. 
2°Laurent lists four characteristics ot immanent action (PP. 
238-239); 1). Est pertectio agentis secunda; 2) est pertactio 
sinlplex (poteat invenir! tormallter in Deo at poteat Ident1tlcari 
cum. e8S$ agentis) J 3) necessarl0 requiri t allquam immaterial! ta-
tem quIa allquomodo det agent! perfectiones aliarum rertun; 4) 
est dup11c1s ganeris, cognltio at appetitio. 
21st • Thomas, guaest. Disp. de Veritata, 4, 2 c: ••• sicut 
hoc nomen gperatio, quae procul dUbIo 1mPortat allquid procedens 
ab operants: taman ista processus non est nisi sacundunl rationem 
tantum. 
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vVhether or not something is produced within or outside of the 
agent, this, too, like the need £ar a principle of action, is Rer 
accidens to the activity itselr.22 
Having distinguished motion and actIvity, let us now see why 
self-motion 1s improperly said of i:ma:nanent activity. First, we 
are able to make this distinction: "to live is to be moved by 
oneselt'tf expresses the autonomy of vital activity" while "to live 
is to move oneself" expresses the immanence of that activIty.23 
In both cases, however, as we have seen, self-lilovement requires 
some sort of heterogeneity on the part of the agent so that it 
will be both agent L~d patient in different respects. Therefore. 
an agent that in the strict sense is able to move itself would be 
alive; but it would not be perfectly sL'"!1Ple and thus would in-
clude the imPerfection 01" motion in the strict sense. Hammond 
points this out in c~~enting on Aristotle:24 
22Laurent I p. 237: l'Immanenti!J tol'rldni omnino per accidens 
se habere ad operationam'ipsam in ratione operationis. Quod enim 
operatio producat aliquid siva extra sive intra subjectum agons, 
~, ex hoc est perfactlc agentis prout est asens. sed pot1us 
prout simul est patiens. 
23M• Fatta, "La Transcendenza della Vita," Bolletinc Piloso.f! 
00, vol. IV, p. 324: Vivere e 'mover1 a se ips'o': aofio quest' 
angolo visuale ~ l'autonomia dell t attlvlta che risaltaj vivere e 
'movere se ipsum': sotto quest'altro angola visuals e ltimmanen-
za ahe risa1ta. 
2~V. A. HalllInond, Aristotle's 'pSYCholo51. S. Sormenseheln & 
Co. (London, 1902), p. XiI!. 
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Everything that f,10VeS itse1.f contains a duality o.f mov-
ing principle and thing moved.... Every living thing, 
a plant no less than a man is a composite being (crJ'vcP)ov), 
viz. a cOlm:>osite oJ: soul and body. The soul is the cause 
o.f motion and change, and j.S therefore the 'efficient 
cause t; it is further that which deterr.1ines the fornl or 
ind! viduali ty ot the organism, and is there.fore the 'for-
mal cause'; it is also the end .for which the body exists, 
and is. for that reason, the '.final cause.' 
And Aristotle himself points out that: 
For, lIDless 1 am 11listaken, the definition of soul as 
the self-moving, or as that which is capable o.f sel.f-
motion, misrepresents its essential nature: nay, luore; . 
it is quite impossible for soul to have the attribute 
of motion at a11.25 
Any motions in the living thing pertain to the whole being that 
happens also to be a material living thlllg.26 Further, St • 
. 
Thomas points out that metaphorically even God could be said to 
25Aristotle, De Anima, 40Sb31-40SQ2. 
_ .................. -
26Ibid ., 408~-l5: The soul is said to .feel pain and., joy, 
con.fId€iii'Ci' and .fear, and agaIn to be angry, to pereel va and to 
think; and all these states are held to be movements: which ndgh 
lead one to In.fer that soul Itsel.f 1s moved. But this 1s no nec-
essary In.farence •••• £ror even to suppose that-all these are 
movement!] doubtless it would be better not to say that the soul 
pIties or learns or thinks" but that the man does so with the 
soul: and this, too, not in the sense that the motion occurs in-
the soul, but in the sense that motion sometimes reaches to, some I, 
tImes s tarts .from, the soul. (And St. Tb.a:nas agrees in S. Th., I 
II, 22, 1 ad 2: Ad secundum dicend'lUll, quod pat! at mover! ~si III, 
non conveniat animae per sa, convenit taman ai per accidens, ut 
in I De Anima dioitur.) 
-
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move Himself in so fa.r as He loves Himself .27 The point to be 
stressed here. then, is that in its proper sense, life does not 
mean self-movement; nor is self-movement equivalent to immanent 
activity. This is true even though life and a principle of im-
manent operation are necessary as the agent in selt-movement. 
F'urther, as we saw in chapter three, the most immanent ot vital 
activities is the act of' understanding. We will, therefore, dis-
cuss a few aspects of tmderstanding as perfect lite. 
LIFE PAR h"XCELLEliCE. UnderstandJ.ng is the perfect intl1l8.l1ent 
aetion because it neither depends ml prior movements nor is in-
volved ~er !! with external qualifications. Tnis non-dependence 
on mOVeL1ent 1s to be taken as referring to the very act of tmder-
standing. To become perfect through an intelligible species be-
longs to that intellect that is samet~nes in potency; but the 
divine intellect 1s in no way in potency, needs no intel~igible 
species to actuate It, and is Its own perfection and own act 01" 
27st • Thomas, In I Sent., 45, 1, 1 ad 3: Ad tertltml dicendum. 
quod voluntas non move~ur niSi a. fine: f1nis Q.utem voluntatis 
divinae est ipsa sua bonitas quae est idem quod voluntas secund'Ull1 
:ree; et ideo non sequitur quod Deus sit movens motum, proprie 10-
quendo, quia omne movens est allud a moto. Sed forte propter hoe 
l)lato posuit quod primum movens seipsum movet, Inquantum cognos-
cit se at amat se ••• at hoc non nisi metaphorice dicitur, sicut 
etlw'll dleltur quod finis movet. 
28 undsl'l'Standing. 
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Aristotle points out that actually 11.fe acoording to reason 
for rn.an is the presence of' something divine in him; and yet he 
advisos us to £ollow such a lil'e accordi..~g to reason, transcend-
iIlg merely l'aortal things. But this life, he continues, does not 
really transcend man, rather it is the better part of him. And 
n~ should strive to live according to his better part. "Reason 
more than anything else.!! man.,,29 In his co.mmentary, st. Thomas 
28st. TJ:1OOlaS, S. Th., r, 14, 2 ad 2: Non enim inte11igero as 
motus, qui est act~ I;per.fectl, qui est ab alio in a1:tud; sed ac 
tus per.fecti exlsten& 1n ipso agente. S1m1litel' etiwn quod intel 
lectus perf!oiatur ab inte11:tgib1li, vel asslmiletur ei, hoc con-
venit Intelleetu:t qui quandoque est in potentia; quia per hoc quo 
est in potentia, dl.f.fert ab 1ntel1igibl11, et assim11atur 6i per 
speeiem intel1igibl1em, quae est similitudo rei intel1eotae, et 
perflcitur per ipsam, sicut potentia per actmu. Sed 1ntel1ectus 
divinus, qui nuJ.lo mooo est in potentia, non perticitur per in-
tell1g1bl1e» neque asslm1latur ai, sad est sua peri'actio at suum 
Intell1gere. 
29Arlstotle, Eth. Nlch., 1177b30-117S8 S: Ir reason is divine 
then, in comparisan-wl~E nwn, the life acoording to it is divine 
in comparison with human li.fe. But wa must not follow those who 
advise us, being men. to think of human things, and» being mortal 
of' mortal things, but must, so far as We can, make ourselves 1m-
monal, and strain every nel"VG to live in accordance with the 
best thing in us; for even if it ba srnall in bulk, much more does 
1. t in power and worth surpass everything. This wou.ld seem, too l-
to be each man himself, since it is the authoritative and better I 
part or him. It would be stmnge, then, if he were to ohoose not 'I 
the lite of his self' but that of something else. And what we 
said before (l169b33, 11761>26) will apply now; that which is 
proper to aaoh thing 1s by nature best and nlost pleasant .for each 
thing; ter man, theref'ore, the lIre according to reason 1s best 
and pleasantest, since reason more than anything else is :man. 
This lire there.fore is also the happiest. (This is Ross' trans-
lation. ) 
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For that which 1s best 1n each one accwding to nature is 
most proper tor him. But it tollows from being best and 
proper that 1 t be IllOSt desirable9 because each one de-
lights in the good that belongs to him. Therefore, 1t is 
evident that irE is most properly intellect as the 
raost important owe~ he has I then the life which is ac-
cording to Inte lect is most desirable tor man, and most 
proper to him. Nor 1s this contrary to what was said 
above about this lite being not on the level of man, but 
above him. For it is not on the level ot man in so tar 
as he is a composite nature; but it is most proper to 
:b..1m on the level ot that which is most important in him. 
This type ot l1£e, it is true, is found most perfectly 
in higher substances; in man it is found imperfectly and 
as if participated. Yet, this little is greater than 
all else in man. 
Reasoning processes and sensible beginnincs ot knowledge are pro-
per to understanding as man slmres in it; but, as we have seen, 
these belong to man because of the potential aspects of his na-
ture. It it were possible to grasp in a single intuition all the 
conclusions contained in Imown principles, there would be no dis-
30St. Thomas, In X Eth. ad Nic., leet. XI: Illud enim quod 
est optimum secundum natura.m-rri unoquoque est m.axlme proprlum si-
bi: quod autem est optimum at prapri'Um, conaequens est quod sit 
delectabl11ss1mum, quia unusquisque delectatur in bono sib! con-
venient!. Sic ergo patet, quod a1 homo maxima est tntelleetus 
tamquam prineipa11ssirnum in ipso, quod vita quae est secundum in-
tellectum est delectabillssima hamini, at maxima sibi propria. 
Nee hoc est contra id quod supra dictum est, quod non est secun-
dum hominem, sed supra hominem: non est enim secundum hominem 
quantum ad natura.m cOl11Posltam., est autem propriissime secundum 
hominem quantum ad Id quod est princlpallss1mum in homine: quod 
quidem peri'ectissime 1nvenltur in substantiis superioribus, in 1'10 
mine Qutem imperfects at quasi participative. Et trunen istud 
parvum est l'.l'lagis onmibus aliis quae in hOmine sunt. 
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cursive process.51 But as it is for man, there is a two-fold pro 
cess in man's In10wledge:32 ane is successive, wherein after we 
tmders ta."1d one thing, we turn our a tten t i on to s ometh:1.!1.g e lae ; 
the other is the reasoning prooess trom principle to conclusion. 
"Man 1s indeed like the aneels in mind and intellect, but he dit-
te rs in his mode ot unde rs t8.J."1d ing. ,,33 
Man, then, possesses two t'ypes of vital activities: the one 
in a sense exterior and in accord with his sensible, bodily na-
ture; the other, in which there is real communication with God an 
31St • Thomas S. Th., I, 58, 3 0; Sic igitur at interiores 
Intellectus, sCii1cethominum, per quemdrun motum et dlacursum in-
tellactualis operatlonls perfectlonem in cognitions veritatls 
ad1piscuntur dum scilicet ex uno cognlto in aliud oognltum prooe-
dunt. S1 autem statim in ipsa cognitione principii noti inspi-
cerant quasi notas omnem conc1uslones consequentes, in eis discur 
sus locum non habo1'&t. ' 
32St. Thomas, 8. Th., I, 14, 7 c: In sc1ent1a entm noatra 
duplex est discurB'Us :-unus secundum successionem tantum)" sicut 
CUlil., postquam. 1ntellig1mus aliqu1d in actu, convertinrus nos ad 
1ntel11gendum aliud; alius discuraus est secundunl causa11 tatelu; 
sicut cum per principia pervenimus in oogn1tionem conc1usionum. 
33St. ~lamas, s. Th., I-II, 89, 4 ad 1: Hamo convenit qui-
dem cum ange11s in-mente sive in Intellectu; sed dirfert in modo 
intel11gend1.... See also S. 1'h., I, 59, 1 ad 1: Sed 1ntellee-
tus at ratio d1ftol"tmt quan'rUllt'ad ::100um cog.'1oscendi: quia scili-
cet lntelleetus cognosc1t simplici intuitu, ratio vero discurren-
do de uno in allud. Sed ta~';'len ratio par discursum pervenlt ad 
cognoscendum 111ud quod intellectus sine discursu cognoscit, sci-
licet universale. 
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the angels.34 Consider this remarkable text from the Metaphysics 
of Aristotle:35 
And thinking in i taelf deals with that which 1s best in 
itself, and that which is thinlc1ng in the fullest sense 
with that which 1s best in the tullest sense. And thought 
thinks on itself because it shares the nature of the ob-ject of thought; for it becomes an object of thought in 
corning into contact with and thin..tring its objects, so 
that thought and the object of thought are the same. For 
that which is capable 01' receivinG the object of thought, 
i.e., the essence, Is thought. But it is active when it 
~ossesses this Object. ~wrefore the possession rather 
han the receptivity is the divine element which thought 
seems to contain, and the act of contemplation is what is 
most pleasant and best. It, then, God is always in that 
state in which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder; 
and if' in a better, this compels it yet more. And God is 
in a better state. And life also belongs to God; for tEe 
actuality of thou~Vlt is life, and God is that actuality; 
and God t S sel.f-dependent actuality is life most good and 
eternal. We say therefore that God is a living being, 
eternal, most good, so that 11fe and duration continuous 
and eternal belong to God; tor this is God. 
-
It is the possession rather than the receptivity that is the di-
vine element in thought; it is the act of contemplation which is 
" 
the most pleasurable, best, and highest type 01" lite. The actual 
ity 01" thought is life -- a.nd so God is most truly alive. This i 
an interesting conclUSion, indeed: there is no life tha.t !nvol ves 
a h1gher level ot activity than contemplation. Usually we con-
54st • Thanas, S. Tll., II-II, 23, 1 ad 1: Ad pr1mum ergo di-
cendum, quod duplex est hordn1s vita.: una. quidem exterior secun-
dum naturam sensibilem et corporalem, et secundum hanc vitam non 
est nobis co~nunicatio vel conversatio cum Deo at angelia: alia 
autelil est vita hominis spiritua.l1s secundum mentem; at secundum 
bane vitam est nobis conversat10 at cum Deo at cum angelia. 
35Aristotle, Meta., l072~7-29. 
-
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trast the active and the conte~~lative life. And yet, we now 
see that the fullest measure of activity is found in conte~pla­
tion. "Active life" means lire of notions, human actions, and 
passions directed by the practical intellect; but our full hap-
piness (in the next lii'e) is to be found in contemplation, while 
imperfect happiness (in this life) is to be found principally in 
contemplation and seoondarily in other activities.S6 
LIFE AS OPERA'11 I,::m • Lit'e is sa.id of lIvIng things in two 
ways: either to signify the very . .2!!.!! or the living thing, 01'> to 
signify its operations.37 vlith :respect to the second way lii'e is 
predicated, Aristotle says:38 
!low life is defined in the cnso of animals by the power 
of perception, in that of man by the power of perception 
or thought; and a power is defined by reference to the 
corresponding activity, which is the essential thing; 
therefore life seems to be essentially the act of per-
ceiving or thinking. 
3Sst • Thomas, S. Th., I-II, 3, 5 c: Tertio idem apparet [qU 
beatitudo maNr"iS consiitlt in operatione speculativi fnte11ectus 
quam practic ex hoc quod in vita contemplativa homo eommunicat 
cum superior bus, scilicet cum Deo et angelis, quibus per beati-
tudinem asaimilatl.U"j sed in his quae pertinent ad vitam activwn, 
etiEU1l ali8, anlmalia cum honrl.ne aliqualiter communicant, licet im-
perfecta. 
37St • '1"£101110.8, In I Sent., 8, 5, 3 ad 3: Ad tertium dicendum 
quod vlvere in antmali CII'CItur duplicitur: uno modo vivere est 
ipsum esse viventfs, sicut dicit Phi1osopl1US (2 De Anima, text. 
37): Vivere viventibua est es~ei at hoc modo anima Immediate ra-
cit vivere quamlibet partem corporiS, inquantum est eius fonnaJ 
alio :modo dicitur vivere pro operations animas. 
38Aristotle, Eth. Nich., 11708 16-19. 
--
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In this sense of the te:rm. lire means everything we have dlscusse 
thus far. For, our method has been an analysis of activity; and 
our conclusion ha.s been an understanding of' what it means to say 
that l1te is the principle of ir~ent activity. This is to de-
.fine li1'e in terms of vital operations. Thus, to sense is said 
to be the life ot animals and to understand, the lite of men. In 
this meaning, lii'e is taken tor that operation towards which the 
whole individual is espeeially orientated; in this sense, too, 
li1'e 1s seen as the perfection of a potency, activity with respec 
to a vital power.39 On the other hand, the terms "to sense" and 
"to understand" are not used merely to reter to the operations of 
the one sensinG or understanding; rather, they more properly re-
fer to tho esse of tl~ living thing, in such a way as to mean one 
-
Imving the nature to sense or to understand.40 
" 
LIFE AS SUBSTAnTIAL. In its fullest sense, 11fe 1s an es-
39St• Thomas, In IV Sent., d. 49, 1, 2, qat. 3 c: CU1us11bet 
autem potentiae perI'ectl0 est suus actus: tmde secundo transla-
tum est nomen vitae ad s1gnificandam operationem ad quam aliquis 
seipsum movet, sicut sentire dieitur vita anima11s, et intelliger 
vita hominis: et secundum hunc modum unusquisque illa..'lU operatlo-
nem suam vitam reputat cui maxima intendit, quasi ad hoc sit to-
tum esse su~~ ordinatum •••• 
40 i St. Thomas, S. Th., I, 18, 2 ad 1: Ad pr mum ergo dieen-
dum, quod Ph11osopnus-rbl accipit vlvere pro operations vitae. 
Vel d1cendum est meliUS, quod sentire at 1ntel1lgere, at hujus-
modi, quandoque sumuntur pro qulbusdam operatlonibus; quandoque 
autem pro ipso esse sic operantium. Dicitur enim, quod vlvere 
est sentire vel Intelligere; Id est habere naturam ad sentiendum 
vel intell1gendum. 
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sentia,l predioate/11 st. Thomas explains that the name lire is 
-
taken .from certain observable .features about a thing, namely, 
that it laoves itsel.f. But the name is given not to signi.fy that 
self-movement, but to signify the substance whose power it is to 
:move itself to activity: 
And in this respect to live is nothing else than to be 
(esse) in such a. nature; and lff'e signifies this very 
same thing, but in an abstracrwi'y. This is like the 
name runn~ which signifies the very aot of' to run, 
but aos£ra~ly. Therefore, life 1s not an acoidental, 
but a substantial predicate.~o.metimes, however, li£e 
is taken less properly f'or the ogeratians of 11.fe,-rFOm 
wh10h the name itself is taken.4;:; 
"To live" is to be in sueh a nature; and Ifllt'e" signifies this 
very thing, but in an abstract way. What does this mean in the 
light or our investigation? 
Having discovered that an actual principle, a form, is the 
sotwce of all, including vital, activities, we must now ask 
41St • Thomas, S. Th., rII, 50, 5 c: Cum vita sit aliquid de 
essentia. oorporis viventis, est anim praedicatum essentiale, non 
accidentale; uncle consequens est quod corpus quod desinlt esse 
viVum, non totaliter idem remaneat. 
42St • Thomas, s. ~l., I, 18, 2 c: Sic ergo dicendum est et 
de vita. Nam vitae nomen sumitur ex quodan1 exterius apparenti 
circa rarel, quoC1 es~ movere seipsum: non taman est inlpositum hoc 
nomen ad hoc sign1i'icandtll1l, sed ad signii'lcandum substnntiam cui 
eonvenit secundum suam naturrun movere selps'Ui."n, vel agere sa quo-
cumque modo ad operationem. Et secundum hoc vlvere nihil aliud 
est quam esse in tal! natura; et vita signiflcat hoc ipsum, sed 
in abstraoto; sicut hoc nomen, cUFiUS, signl.ficat ips~~ currare 
in abstracto. Unde vivum non est praedicrunentum aceidentale, sed 
substantia1e. ~uandoque taman vita sumitur minus propria pro 
operntian1bus vitae, a qu1bus nomen vitae assumitur. 
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whethe!' this form. is the ultimate SOU1"ce of vital activities or 
whethe!' there is some p!'inciple actualizing even for.m. As we 
have seen in chapter one, there is such a p!'inciple: esse, the 
-
act of existing. 'rhe act of eXisting, then, which is prope!' to 
a being, is the ultimate source of the vital (and other) activi-
ties of that being in so fa!' as it existentializes the activities 
as well as the nature from which the activities come. Esse it-
-
self is the dynamism of the being; it is to such an extent ac-
tivity that only a verb properly expresses it. A verb -- a word 
signit'ying action -- must be used to point to this continuity of 
"doing-sor:lething." This activity, however, may take many dif-
ferent modes in different bein[;s; but each type of activity is 
properly expressed by a verb, which expresses an aspect of the 
act ot' existing itsel.f. Thus it is that the act of living is the 
act o.f existing which a living thing has, and "to live is·, to be 
.for living things." 
To live, then, is to be with the type of existence given by 
a certain form. Life signifies the very same existence, but dif-
-
fers as an abstract ter.m differs .from a concrete. Vlvere signi-
fies the activity of life as it is this lUe; vita abstracts .from 
-
the one who lives. Thus, to live is just as analogous as esse. 
-
This analogy is really two-fold. To 11 va, as aI/plied to God and 
to creatures, 1s said analogously: in God, to live is identified 
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by a certain form and thus bas the oharaoter of principle. 43 To 
live as applied only to creatures, is also said analogously; but 
it is said of' eaoh in the same way in one respeot, as a prinoiple 
of' their being. 
To oonolude, then: 
1. There can he no one assen'tial definition of life, even 
tal<en abstractly. Life is ru~alogous and is applied to each being 
in the way it is found there. There are, of' oourse, oertain logi-
oa1 olassifications of living things, but to "olassirrt means to 
"leave out." And there is nothing in a lIving thing to whioh to 
-
live does not pertain; as also with esse. 
- -
2. Vie are a.ble to characterize, in terms of the metaphysi-
cal de.fin1tlon discussed in chapter one, the main aspect of vivere 
which ha.s una1ogous application in different 1i ving things. For, 
again, v:.1v~re is to be "definedu just as (analogously) as' ~ 1s 
ude.flnod": esse is that whereby an essence aotually exists, tak-
-
lng essence in the wide sense to inolude accidents. 
5. Thus, 12 .... l ;;.l .... ve .... is that perfection whereby all the other 
perfeotions of' a potentially living thing are so aotualized that 
43st• ~l~las; contra Gentes, I, o. 98: Vita enim viventis 
est Ipsum vivere in quaaam aos\raotione sign1ficatum; siout cur-
sus, secundum rem, non est a.llud quam ourrare. Vi vere autem 
viventium est ipsum esse eorum, ut patet per Philosophum (De 
AnimA, II, text. camm.. 75): O~1 en1In ex hoe animal dlcatur-
vIvens, quod animam habet, seoundunl quam habet esse utpote secun-
dum propriam fo~~~, oportet quod vivere nihil sit allud quam 
tale esse ex tali formaprovenlens. Deus autem est SUUl'll esse, ut 
supra (c. 22) probatum est. Est erDo BUUl'll vivere et sua vita. 
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such a being 1s able to elicit motions and operations that are in 
some way of itself. 
4:. Of' course, such ter-l1l8 as fI IJotentlally 11 ving" are applied 
to God a.£ter our :manner of dividing what is sir..1Ple so that Vie r..1UY 
understand it. Thus, the essence 01' God is thought of: as distinct 
trom His existence, by a distinction of reason only. This diffi-
culty only points up the Greater difficulty of including both God 
and creatures under one "definition" or life. 
5. Life, then, in its proper sense, is a metaphysical prin-
ciple of being, nothing else than the esse, the act of existing a 
living thing has. In a less proper sense, lIfe is the vital ac-
tivity of a living thing, or the source of that activity. In 
either case, lire represents what 1s actual in a thing; as such, 
its nature transcends matter and is applicable to God Himself. 
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